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I Articles I
Playing Poohsticks with the British
Constitution? The Blair Government's
Proposal to Abolish the Lord Chancellor
Susanna Frederick Fischer*
ABSTRACT
This paper critically assesses a recent and significant constitutional
change to the British judicial system. The Constitutional Reform Act
2005 swept away more than a thousand years of constitutional tradition
by significantly reforming the ancient office of Lord Chancellor, which
straddled all three branches of government. A stated goal of this
legislation was to create more favorable external perceptions of the
British constitutional and justice system. But even though the enacted
legislation does substantively promote this goal, both by enhancing the
separation of powers and implementing new statutory safeguards for
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judicial independence, the process of constitutional reform did not
comport with it. The reform process suffered from undue speed,
excessive secrecy, and failure to ensure adequate consultation and debate
on the reform proposals. It also created an atmosphere of distrust that
not only forced the government's retreat from its initial goal of entirely
abolishing the office of Lord Chancellor, but also failed to achieve public
confidence that the reforms were needed as a matter of reasoned
principle. Like the game of Poohsticks, chance played too great a role in
the constitutional reforms. This flawed process is inconsistent with the
goal of improving external perceptions of justice, fairness, and judicial
independence from political pressure. These recent constitutional
reforms in the United Kingdom are worthy of American attention
because external perceptions of the justice and fairness of the American
constitutional system are growing in importance in an era in which the
United States, like the United Kingdom, seeks to export its democratic
values across the globe and struggles to ensure the appropriate level of
judicial independence. Increasingly, it matters not only that justice be
done, but also that it must be seen to be done.
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I. Introduction
Several American Supreme Court justices, including Justices Sandra
Day O'Connor and Anthony Kennedy, have recently argued that
American judges should pay greater attention to international law and
legal developments.1 Justice O'Connor has urged American judges to do
this not only to better inform their decision making, but also to create a
good impression of American justice abroad. 2  "The impressions we
create in this world are important, and they can leave their mark,"
O'Connor has said.3 Under this approach, which emphasizes the
importance of comporting with shared international human rights norms,
justice must not only be done; it must be done visibly.
Similar concerns have recently spurred major and highly
controversial constitutional reforms in the United Kingdom. This article
focuses on changes to the ancient office of Lord Chancellor, which, prior
to the reforms, straddled all three branches of government.4  The Lord
Chancellor was part of the judicial branch of government as a senior
1. See, e.g., Warren Richey, Global legal trends make waves at high court,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 21, 2004, at 2. As Richey notes, three of the current
justices strenuously disagree with O'Connor's position, at least as to the extent to which
the court should use foreign materials to interpret the United States Constitution. See,
e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (in which Justice Scalia wrote in dissent that
the Court "should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on Americans" (joined by
Rehnquist, C.J. and Thomas, J., and citing the words of Thomas, J. in Foster v. Florida,
537 U.S. 990 (2002) (concurring in denial of certiorari))). See also A Conversation on
the Relevance of Foreign Law for American Constitutional Adjudication with U.S.
Supreme Court Justices Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer (Jan. 13, 2005), transcript and
video available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/2005/050113.cfm.
2. See Bill Rankin, U.S. Justice is honored; O'Connor says court has its ear to the
world, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Oct. 29, 2003, at 3A (quoting from
O'Connor's speech at a dinner commemorating her as the recipient of the Southern
Center for International Studies World Justice Award).
3. Id.
4. See Press Release, 10 Downing Street, Modernising Government-Lord
Falconer appointed Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs [hereinafter Modernising
Government Press Release] (June 12, 2003), available at http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page3892.asp. The official title of this office is Lord High Chancellor
of Great Britain, but this essay will use the more commonly used moniker "Lord
Chancellor." See S.H. BAILEY ET. AL, SMITH, BAILEY & GUNN ON THE MODERN ENGLISH
LEGAL SYSTEM 247 n. 87 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter BAILEY]; see also DEP'T FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM:
REFORMING THE OFFICE OF LORD CHANCELLOR [hereinafter DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03] 12 (Sept. 2003); see also Lord Elwyn-Jones,
Foreword, in NICHOLAS UNDERHILL, THE LORD CHANCELLOR X (1978). By convention,
the Lord Chancellor has also held the office of Lord Keeper of the Great Seal, at least
since the reign of King George III. See Oonagh Gay & Richard Kelly, The Constitutional
Reform Bill [HL]-the office of Lord Chancellor, Bill No. 18 of 2004-5, Research Paper
05/05, Parliament and Constitution Centre, House of Commons Library 19 (Jan 12,
2005), available at http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2005/rp05-
005.pdf.
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judge and head of the judiciary, part of the executive branch as a senior
cabinet minister, and also part of the legislative branch as a member and
ex officio speaker of the House of Lords.5 The Constitutional Reform
Act, which was enacted in March 2005 after considerable Parliamentary
and public controversy, did not abolish the office of Lord Chancellor but
substantially changed it.6  The Lord Chancellor will no longer
automatically serve as speaker of the House of Lords.7 Nor will he serve
as a judge or as head of the judiciary, and his role in relation to the
appointment and disciplining of the judiciary is greatly reduced.8
Additionally, the Constitutional Reform Act imposes a new statutory
duty on the Lord Chancellor and other government Ministers to uphold
judicial independence. 9
This article critically assesses how these reforms to the Lord
Chancellor's office became law. It argues that while the Constitutional
Reform Act's changes to the Lord Chancellor's functions are, viewed
substantively, largely positive in outcome, the process by which these
reforns were implemented is cause for serious concern. By enhancing
the separation of powers, the reforms that were ultimately enacted
promote the external perception that the British constitutional and
judicial systems are grounded in the rule of law and judicial
independence from political pressures. But the speed, secrecy, and lack
of adequate consultation that characterized the Blair government's
(hereafter "Government") constitutional reform process do not promote
similarly favorable external perceptions. As one elected Tory peer, the
Earl of Onslow, has charged, the Government has been playing
Poohsticks with Britain's constitution and with 800 years of British
liberty.1°
Poohsticks is a game played by Winnie-the-Pooh and his friends.
Each player stands on a bridge and, facing upstream, throws a stick into
the water at the same time. The players then cross to the downstream
side of the bridge and watch as the current carries the sticks under the
bridge. The player whose stick floats past the bridge first is the winner.
5. For more information on the Lord Chancellor's functions, see infra Part III.
6. Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (U.K.) (This legislation was approved by
both Houses of Parliament on Mar. 21, 2005 and received Royal Assent on Mar. 24,
2005.).
7. Id. at § 18, Sch. 6.
8. Id. at § 7, 11, Sch. 4.
9. Id. at § 3.
10. 649 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2003), col. 443 (speech of the Earl of Onslow);
see also Philip Johnston, Cavalier attitude to major changes is creating chaos, THE
DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 14, 2003, at 8; Bob Sherwood, Irvine goes as Blair overhauls
judiciary: Summary abolition of lord chancellor's post to pave way for US-style supreme
court sparks Tory protest, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 13, 2003, at 1.
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Just as the winner of a Poohsticks competition was completely reliant on
random chance, so was the likelihood of the Government's rushed and
secret initial constitutional reform proposals ultimately improving the
British constitutional system." Playing Poohsticks is a dangerous way to
conduct constitutional reform, particularly in an era of globalization
where the eyes of the world are watching and judging the process. Even
if justice is ultimately done, it is crucial for justice to be seen to be done.
The global perception that established democratic societies, including the
United Kingdom and the United States, comport with their core
constitutional values, such as impartial justice and the rule of law, is a
pressing concern in an era in which these societies seek to spread
democracy across the globe.
12
Part II of this article briefly introduces the Government's initial
proposal to reform the office of Lord Chancellor, considering how and
why it initially sought to abolish the office as well as the widespread
opposition it received, especially from the senior judiciary. Part III
provides historical background on the role and functions of the Lord
Chancellor, from the medieval origins of the office up to the
Government's 2003 announcement of its planned abolition. Part IV
points out that concern about the Lord Chancellor's multifaceted role is
not new by examining several unsuccessful efforts to reform the office
over the past two centuries. Part V demonstrates how the process of
reform suffered from a lack of transparency, a lack of consultation, and
excessive haste that did not inspire public confidence that the reforms
were necessary or founded in reasoned principle. As a result, the
Government suffered many setbacks in the legislative process. These
eventually forced the abandonment of the Government's initial plans to
abolish the office of Lord Chancellor, although it did succeed in enacting
legislation that profoundly changed the office. Part VI concludes that it
is important for Americans to pay attention to this major British
constitutional reform because they are facing a similar challenge to
promote favorable external perceptions of their system of government,
and are also struggling with the problem of ensuring an appropriate level
of judicial independence. In an era in which America seeks to export its
democratic values, it is of crucial importance to ensure that its system not
11. See A.A. MILNE, THE HOUSE AT POOH CORNER 242-46 (Chancellor Press 1989)
(1928).
12. See, e.g., Jim VandeHei, Bush Calls Democracy Terror's Antidote, WASH. POST,
Mar. 9, 2005, at A16 (describing speech by President George W. Bush advocating the
global spread of democracy); Raymond Colitt et al., Blair calls for unity in the face of
world challenges, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at 10 (describing speech by Prime Minister
Tony Blair that claims that there is a growing global consensus on the need to spread
democracy).
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only is, but also appears to be, comporting with those values and with
fundamental human rights.
II. The 2003 Proposal to Abolish the Lord Chancellor
In June 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair suddenly announced plans
for massive constitutional changes to the British justice system that
would sweep away well over a millennium of tradition. These plans
were by no means the first major constitutional changes initiated by the
Government. Since Blair's Labour Party came to power in 1997, the
Government has fully or partially implemented more than a dozen
others.' 3  These include the removal of all but ninety-two of the
hereditary peers from Parliament's upper house, the House of Lords, as
the first stage of a two-part reform of that body; the enactment of human
rights and freedom of information legislation; and the devolution of
certain powers previously held by the United Kingdom Parliament to
new legislative bodies in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.
14
The plan for reform announced in June 2003 included two major
reform proposals other than abolishing the office of Lord Chancellor.
These were the removal of most judicial functions from Parliament by
replacing the current final court of appeal, a House of Lords committee, 15
13. Professor Vernon Bogdanor listed fifteen major constitutional reforms in a recent
article, counting the proposals announced in June 2003 as one reform. See Vernon
Bogdanor, Our New Constitution, 120 LAW Q. REV. 242, 242-43 (2004).
14. Id.
15. See Modernising Government Press Release, supra note 4. This committee is
called the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, which is commonly referred to as
the "House of Lords." See BAILEY, supra note 4, at 122. It is the final court of appeal for
both civil and criminal matters in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, but only for
civil matters in Scotland. See GARY SLAPPER & DAVID KELLY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL
SYSTEM 115 (6th ed. 2003); see also BAILEY, supra note 5 at 120-21 (noting that the
House of Lords hears appeals from the Court of Appeal (in England, Wales, and Northern
Ireland), in rare cases, "leapfrog" appeals from the High Court (in England, Wales, and
Northern Ireland), appeals from the highest civil court in Scotland, the Scottish Court of
Session, and appeals from the Courts-Martial Appeal Court, but does not hear appeals
from the highest Scottish criminal court, the High Court of Justiciary. The House of
Lords usually hears judicial business as a committee of the House of Lords, and only very
rarely hears such business while sitting as the entire House of Lords. See DEP'T FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS CONSULTATION PAPER 11/03, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: A
SUPREME COURT FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM [hereinafter DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 11/03] 9 (July, 2003). The judges who hear appeals to
the House of Lords are formally named the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, and are
colloquially called the "Law Lords"; they are appointed and hold life peerages. See
Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict., c. 59 § 6; see also Susanna Frederick
Fischer, Rethinking Sullivan: New Approaches in Australia, New Zealand, and England,
34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 112 (2002). There can be no more than twelve Law Lords at
any given time, but holders of high judicial office who are members of the House of
Lords and who are under the age of seventy-five may also sit as judges. DEP'T FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 11/03, supra, at 8. After devolution,
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with a new Supreme Court,16 and the introduction of a totally new system
for judicial appointments.
The Government's position was that these reforms were necessary
not because the British justice system was actually failing to adequately
protect democratic values and human rights, but to foster greater
transparency, accountability, and increased public confidence in this
system, both domestically and internationally. 17  In other words, the
primary concern was not so much that justice was not being done, as that
it had to be seen to be done. Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who, as the
current Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs,
has been in the unenviable situation of attempting to abolish his own
position, emphasized this purpose in his introduction to the
Government's September 2003 Consultation Paper on reforming the
office of Lord Chancellor. He stated there that "[t]he Office of Lord
Chancellor has been the subject of criticism for some time. In particular
by combining the three primary roles of Minister, Judge and Speaker of
the House of Lords, these distinct functions have become obscured, even
confused."'
18
Lord Falconer made clear that the Government was seeking to
increase public confidence in the constitutional system. He said: "[o]ur
the Appellate Committee is no longer the highest court in England, Wales, Northern
Ireland, and Scotland (in civil matters) because the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council's case law on devolution matters is binding on all other courts, including the
Appellate Committee. See Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, § 103(1) (UK), Northern Ireland
Act, 1998, c. 47, § 82(1) (U.K.), Government of Wales Act, 1998, c. 38, sched. 8, 32(b)
(U.K.).
16. The name of this new court, the "Supreme Court," suffered from potential
confusion with the existing Supreme Court of England and Wales. See Supreme Court
Act 1981, c. 54, § 1 (Eng.). The existing Supreme Court was not the final appeals court
for those jurisdictions, but included several lower trial and appellate courts: the High
Court, Crown Court, and Court of Appeal. The reason that this collection of courts bore
the title "Supreme Court" is the result of the legislation creating it, the Judicature Act of
1873, which abolished the House of Lords' appellate jurisdiction, so that there was no
superior appeals court. See SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 15, at 109-110, 146. However,
three years later this situation changed when a new government enacted the Appellate
Jurisdiction Act of 1876 reinstating the House of Lords as the highest court of appeal.
See id. at 109-110.
17. 429 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005), col. 554 (speech of Christopher Leslie,
Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Constitutional Affairs) (stating that the "fundamental
principles driving the reforms" were "the need to modernize our constitution so that our
institutions can serve the public in a clearer, more transparent and more effective manner;
so that our courts and justice system can be administered by a full-time Minister clearly
accountable to Parliament; and so that the relationship between the three arms of the
state-Parliament, the judiciary, and the Executive-is settled, clarified and easier to
understand, in turn making each better fitted to carry out its vital roles in a modem
democracy").
18. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra note
4, at Foreword.
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existing arrangements have become increasingly hard to sustain, even as
we seek to persuade developing countries to adopt clearer constitutional
mechanisms and provide for the insulation of the judiciary from political
pressures."19
In a speech delivered in December 2003, Lord Falconer later
reiterated these concerns:
There is, I believe, a dissonance between our values as citizens of a
liberal democracy and some of our constitutional arrangements. We
should not ignore that dissonance.... We must ground our changes
in history. We must understand that history shows us we cannot
afford to stand still .... Our programme of reform stems logically
from our progressive values and a firm belief that there is a careful
balance to maintain, between preserving the UK's constitutional
heritage on the one hand, and running the risk of our public
institutions becoming antiquated on the other. A system of
Government cannot remain in thrall to the past; it must be credible
and it must be effective. Sometimes it can achieve this by virtue of
its heritage; sometimes change is required. Our guide is whether
reform augments, first, the credibility and effectiveness of our public
institutions.
20
As well as these concerns about external perceptions of the British
constitutional system, the Government also justified its reform proposals
on the basis that the workload of the Lord Chancellor's office had
increased so much that it was now beyond the ability of any one person
21to manage.
Many critics, including a large number of senior judges, reacted to
22the Government's announcement with shock and outrage. They
criticized the reform proposals as rushed and also as lacking adequate
consultation. Even more seriously, they charged that the planned
reforms were likely to destroy their stated goal of judicial independence
and threatened the rule of law.
Critics of the proposals used strong language to voice their
disapproval. The former Conservative Foreign Secretary Lord Howe of
Aberavon expressed the view that abolishing the office of the Lord
Chancellor would amount to "constitutional vandalism, 23 and also stated
19. Id.
20. Lord Falconer of Thoroton, Constitutional Reform Speech, University College,
London (Dec. 8, 2003), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/2003/lc081203.htm.
21. See HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM BILL,
FIRST REPORT, July 2, 2004, HL 125-1 19 [hereafter HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT
COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM FIRST REPORT], available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/ldcrefhtm
22. See infra, notes 23-27, 253-264 and accompanying text.
23. 663 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004), col. 1156 (speech of Lord Howe of
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that Blair's proposals "could be compared almost to 9/11 in their folly.
24
Lord Justice Judge (yes, his real name), the deputy Lord Chief
Justice,25 warned of the danger that the reforms would open the door to
extremist political interference with justice: "We have to remember that
Hitler came to power in a democratic country by getting a significant
popular vote and then subverting the constitution., 26 Lord Woolf, who,
as Lord Chief Justice was the second-ranking judge in the English legal
system, commented that the reforms constituted the greatest threat to
judicial independence since the seventeenth century, when "a lot of
judges lost their heads. 27 The historical basis of such criticism reflects
the need for a historical perspective on the ancient office of Lord
Chancellor. The next section attempts to provide that perspective.
III. "He gets extremely little sleep": The Multifaceted Office of the
Lord Chancellor
Poor Gentleman-he has to mix
With barristers and lords
He is in charge of lunatics
And coroners and wards;
And what with listening to Earls
And looking after orphan girls,
And imbeciles of every sort,
And judges of the County Court,
And all that kind of thing,
He gets extremely little sleep;
And then of course he has to keep
The conscience of the King:
And sometimes at the close of day
28He gives a vicarage away....
As the writer A.P. Herbert made clear in his 1923 book of comic
poems, Tinker Tailor: A Child's Guide to the Professions, by the middle
years of the twentieth century the office of Lord Chancellor had evolved
into a multifaceted and highly demanding position that was decidedly not
Aberavon).
24. Id. at col. 1152.
25. The Lord Chief Justice of England is the President of the Criminal Division of
the Court of Appeal and is the most senior judge in the Queen's Bench Division of the
High Court. See SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 15, at 210.
26. Bob Sherwood, Judges warn of threat to judicial independence, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2003, at 3.
27. Joshua Rozenberg, Judges Warn of Labour's 'Nazi' threat to justice, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 7, 2003, at 6.
28. A.P. HERBERT, TINKER TAILOR: A CHILD'S GUIDE TO THE PROFESSIONS 22 (1923).
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a job for those who valued their sleep.29 Although the precise origins of
the office are lost in the mists of time, there is clear documentary
evidence of an Anglo-Saxon royal official with the title of Chancellor
dating from 1068.30 Some commentators have contended that the office
is four hundred years older.3' Whether or not they are correct, the office
of Chancellor is certainly ancient, predating Parliament and the Magna
Carta, as well as all other offices of state, except the Crown, and
including even the Prime Minister.32  The historical importance of the
post is clear from the rule of precedence that the Lord Chancellor is the
second subject in the realm, outranked by only the Royal Family and the
Archbishop of Canterbury.33 The long history of the office has also had
a significant impact on the functions of the Lord Chancellor. Many of
these functions were not acquired as a matter of logical planning, but
through historical accident over many centuries.
Chancellors have always served in an executive role as officers of
state and Ministers of the Crown. The early Chancellors were all clerics
29. For an excellent one-volume discussion of the legal and political role of the Lord
Chancellor from its medieval beginnings up until the 1970s, see UNDERHILL, supra note 4
(including a very helpful bibliography). More detail can be found in several well-known
multi-volume histories. See, e.g., LORD CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS
(4th ed., 10 vols., 1856-57) (written by a truly energetic Lord Chancellor who ascended to
the position as an octogenarian); see also J.B. ATLAY, THE VICTORIAN CHANCELLORS (2
vols. 1906-08); R.F.V. HEUSTON, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS 1885-1940
[hereinafter HEUSTON, LIVES 1885-1940] (1964), R.F.C. HEUSTON, LIVES OF THE LORD
CHANCELLORS 1940-1970 [hereinafter HEUSTON, LIVES 1940-1970] (1987). Some of the
more modem Lord Chancellors have penned autobiographies. See, e.g., VISCOUNT
SIMON, RETROSPECT: THE MEMOIRS OF RT. HON. VISCOUNT SIMON (1952), EARL KILMUIR,
A POLITICAL ADVENTURE (1964), LORD ELWYN-JONES, IN MY TIME: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY
(1983), LORD HAILSHAM, A SPARROW'S FLIGHT (1998).
30. See, e.g., UNDERHILL, supra note 4, at 1-5. Despite citing the first documentary
evidence of the chancellor as dating from 1068, Underhill contends that the first actual
holder of the office can be traced to the reign of King Cnut (1016-1035), the first king to
use the royal seal that is the hallmark of the office of Chancellor. Id. at 5.
31. Underhill notes that the nineteenth century biographer Lord Campbell stated that
the office is four centuries older, but based this statement on what Underhill believes to
be questionable sources. Id. at 1-2. The former Lord Chancellor Lord Mackay of
Clashfem (1987-1997) has agreed with Lord Campbell that the office existed since 605
A.D. See Lord Mackay, The Lord Chancellor in the 1990s, 44 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 241 (1991); see also HEUSTON, LIVES 1885-1940, supra note 29, at xv (arguing
that Edward the Confessor (1042-66) was the first English King to have both a great seal
and a Chancellor, though admitting the existence of controversy over the age of the office
of Chancellor).
32. ELWYN-JONES, supra note 29, at x; J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH
LEGAL HISTORY 99 (4TH ed. 2002); Richard Ford, Post dating back 1,400 years is
consigned to history, THE TIMES, June 13, 2003, at 6 (Home news).
33. See HEUSTON, LIVES 1885-1940, supra note 29, at xvi. The significance of the
position is also evident from the fact that assassinating the Lord Chancellor amounts to an
act of high treason. See DIANA WOODHOUSE, THE OFFICE OF LORD CHANCELLOR 1
(2001).
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who, unlike most of their compatriots, had been educated in reading and
writing.34 They therefore could assist the King not only as royal
chaplains, but also as head of the royal secretariat, the Chancery, which
took its name from the Latin word for latticed screens, cancelli.
35
Medieval Chancellors prepared and sealed royal documents such as
charters and writs, and had the authority to use the King's seal in
preparing and authenticating royal documents. 36
The Great Seal of the Realm is the enduring symbol of the office of
the Lord Chancellor. Even as the Lord Chancellor's administrative
duties have changed over the centuries, he 37 has always remained the
keeper of this seal, apart from a five-year period after the Glorious
Revolution of 1688, when there was no Lord Chancellor at all, nor was
there a Lord Keeper of the Great Seal.38 Some Lord Chancellors have
taken their role as keeper of the seal particularly seriously. In the early
nineteenth century, Lord Eldon (1800-27) reportedly slept with the seal
under his pillow.
39
Over time, the Chancellor also acquired a legislative role. Many
Chancellors were extremely powerful politicians. Some, like Cardinal
Wolsey (1515-29), Sir Thomas More (1529-33), and Lord Clarendon
(1658-67), were effectively prime ministers.4° Celebrating the political
skill of Wolsey and More, Lord Hailsham (1970-74, 1979-87)
commented: "They served under a tempestuous, savage, conceited,
treacherous, authoritarian sovereign who has always had a better press
than he deserved.,
4 1
As the office of Chancellor became more politically influential, its
34. Early Chancellors were usually bishops, and sometimes archbishops, although
some were laymen, such as Sir Thomas More (1529-33). The title "Lord Chancellor"
dates from around More's time, and I have accordingly used it only to refer to the
Chancellors who followed More. See WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 4. The last Lord
Chancellor to be a cleric was John Williams (1621-25), the Archbishop of York. Id. at 4
n. 29.
35. BAKER, supra note 32, at 99 n. 14 (repeating a correction first made in the third
edition of his book to his earlier statement that English clerks worked behind such
screens. He stated that there was an absence of evidence to support this, and speculated
that the name had been copied from continental European practice in the late eleventh
century); cf WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 1 (asserting that there were such screens in
the English Chancery, and citing Lord Campbell in support of this assertion).
36. BAKER, supra note 32, at 99.
37. The male pronoun is used because virtually all Chancellors/Lord Chancellors
have been male, except for Queen Eleanor (1253). See Mackay, supra note 31, at 241.
38. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra note
4, at 1; UNDERHILL, supra note 4, at 137. For the period after the Glorious Revolution
when there was briefly no Lord Chancellor, the Lords Commissioners took on the
function of keeper of the Great Seal. See WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 5.
39. See WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 3.
40. BAKER, supra note 32, at 99; see also UNDERHILL, supra note 4, at 67.
41. HAILSHAM,supra note 29, at 379.
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holders got the job of presiding over Parliament in the King's absence,
which eventually crystallized into the ex officio position of Speaker of
the House of Lords, as enshrined in statute in 1539.42 In an ironic twist,
the end result was the loss of some of the Lord Chancellor's political
significance as the seat of political power shifted from the House of
Lords to the House of Commons.43
Chancellors also gradually took on judicial functions. Many
medieval Chancellors held degrees in civil or canon law, and by the early
fifteenth century, they had also assumed the role of "keeper of the King's
conscience. ' '44  At this time, many plaintiffs were unable to obtain
redress in the King's common law courts. The common law courts could
not help them if their claims did not fall within the limited scope of writs
recognized by the common law.45 Some plaintiffs failed to obtain justice
in the common law courts as the result of excessively technical
procedure, fraud, corruption, or undue influence. In such cases, the
Chancellor began intervening to give relief based on his own conscience,
or his personal view of what was just in the circumstances of a particular
case, using simpler and less formalistic procedure than that of the
common law courts. 4 6 The Chancellor also employed more flexible rules
of evidence (such as permitting evidence to be taken by deposition and
from the parties themselves), and developed additional remedies that
were unavailable in the King's courts (including injunctions and specific
performance).47 The Chancellor's system of justice became known as
"equity" by the Tudor period, and crystallized into a kind of law. 48 It did
not fuse procedurally with the common law system until the enactment
of the nineteenth century Judicature Acts, at which time the Lord
Chancellor ceased to function as the "King's conscience. 49
Nevertheless, the Lord Chancellor still retained important judicial
functions, including a different sort of conscience function. He
continued to serve as a judge by reason of his entitlement, as a peer, to sit
in the House of Lords. 50 By the eighteenth century, he was generally
considered to be the most respected British judge and head of the legal
42. See UNDERHILL, supra note 4, at 102.
43. See WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 5.
44. BAKER, supra note 32, at 99 n.16, 103 n.29; DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra note 4, at 2; BAILEY, supra note 4, at 4.
45. BAILEY, supra note 4, at 4.
46. BAKER, supra note 32, at 103-104.
47. BAILEY, supra note 4, at 4.
48. BAKER, supra note 32, at 106.
49. Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66 (Eng.); Supreme
Court of Judicature Act, 1875, 38 & 39 Vict., c. 77 (Eng.).
50. UNDERHILL, supra note 4, at 167-68.
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system.51 By this time, the Lord Chancellor had also acquired a
significant patronage function in appointing judges, which some Lord
Chancellors exercised in an unabashedly partisan fashion. 2 But as head
of the legal system, the Lord Chancellor also acquired the important
constitutional function of guardian of judicial independence, with the
goal of protecting judges from political pressure to ensure their
integrity. 53 In this role, he has continued to have a type of conscience
function.
The range of judicial and administrative duties of the Chancellor
required the assistance of a large number of clerks, even in the middle
ages.54 By the late nineteenth century, the Lord Chancellor had acquired
a permanent administrative staff of personal assistants and advisers. 55
After the Second World War, the office of Lord Chancellor grew into a
sizeable government department headquartered in the House of Lords
and Selborne House in Victoria Street, London.56 By the early years of
the twenty-first century, the Lord Chancellor's Department employed
around 12,000 people, and there were predictions that it would double in
size by 2008."7
By the time of Blair's announcement that the office of Lord
Chancellor would be abolished, the Lord Chancellor had accumulated a
wide range of functions, spanning all three branches of government. 58 In
2003, 347 Acts of Parliament referred to the Lord Chancellor, ranging
from the Treason Act of 1351 to the Finance Act of 2003. 59  The
51. Id. at 169.
52. Id. at 142-43.
53. WOODHOUSE, supra note 33 at 8, 15-16.
54. BAKER, supra note 32, at 100.
55. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra note
4, at 4.
56. Id.; BAILEY, supra note 4, at 16.
57. BAILEY, supra note 4, at 16; Frances Gibb, Lord Chancellor's Role Should End,
TIMES, April 2, 2003, at 15.
58. See generally, WOODHOUSE, supra note 33. See also Robert Stevens, Judicial
Independence: A Loss of Innocence?, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF
DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE WORLD 158, 164 (Peter H.
Russell & David O'Brien, eds., 2001); Diana Woodhouse, The Office of Lord Chancellor,
PUBLIC LAW 617 (1998); Gavin Drewry and Dawn Oliver, Parliamentary accountability
for the administration of justice in THE LAW AND PARLIAMENT (Dawn Oliver & Gavin
Drewry, eds., 1998); Lord Steyn, The Weakest and Least Dangerous Department of
Government, PUBLIC LAW 84 (1997); J. A. G. GRIFFITHS, THE POLITICS OF THE JUDICIARY
(5th ed. 1997); ROBERT STEVENS, THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY: THE VIEW FROM
THE LORD CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE (1993); Mackay, supra note 31; Rodney Brazier,
Government and the Law: Ministerial Responsibility for Legal Affairs, PUBLIC LAW 64
(1989); Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson, The Independence of the Judiciary in the 1980s,
PUBLIC LAW 44 (1988).
59. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra note 4,
at Annex E.
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following subsections describe these functions in some detail.
A. The Lord Chancellor's Executive Functions as a Cabinet Minister
and Head of a Government Department
In 2003, the Lord Chancellor was a member of the executive
branch, as a Cabinet minister, and head of his own government
department, with ministerial responsibility for the administration of
justice. Ministerial responsibility means that the Lord Chancellor was
responsible to Parliament for his operation of the Lord Chancellor's
Department, including for the spending of the financial support granted
by Parliament. 60 As a Cabinet Minister, the Lord Chancellor was also
bound by the doctrine of collective responsibility, which required
Ministers to publicly support government policy even if they did not
personally agree with it.61 However, unlike most Cabinet ministers, Lord
Irvine of Lairg, the Lord Chancellor in 2003, was not and had never been
an elected Member of Parliament.62 A gift of the Prime Minister, the
office of Lord Chancellor was a political appointment, and, in his
executive role, the Lord Chancellor was a government spokesman.63
As the Lord Chancellor's Department grew, his executive role
expanded significantly, especially over the past thirty-five years. The
1971 Courts Act substantially reorganized the English and Welsh court
system on a more formal basis, resulting in a large expansion in the
judiciary and a marked shift in control over the administration of justice
64away from judges to the Lord Chancellor's Department.
By 2003, the Lord Chancellor's responsibilities for judicial
administration included the administration of the higher English and
Welsh courts (other than the two House of Lords judicial committees, the
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council),65 the oversight of the management of the
60. See WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 68-69.
61. An example of the doctrine of collective responsibility in action is the
resignations of Cabinet Ministers Robin Cook and Claire Short because they did not wish
to publicly support the Government's policy in Iraq. The one exception to the doctrine of
collective responsibility, the "agreement to differ" has been used on only three occasions
in the last century. See ADAM TOMKINS, PUBLIC LAW 137 (2003).
62. See WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 11; see also Her Majesty's Government 10
Downing Street Website, http://www.number-I0.gov.uk/output/Pagel371 .asp (has a list
of current Cabinet ministers showing that the vast majority are MPs) (last visited Mar. 24,
2005).
63. See WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 7, 69.
64. Id. at 46-47.
65. See DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra
note 4, at 19, Annex D; see also supra note 58, infra notes 66-67. In 1972, an
executive agency, the Court Service, was created to provide administrative support to all
English and Welsh courts except the House of Lords, the magistrates courts, and certain
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magistrates courts, and the administration of more than a dozen tribunals,
such as the Lands Tribunal, the Office of the Social Security and Child
Support Commissioners, and the General Commissioners of Income
Tax.66 The Lord Chancellor was also responsible for the administration
of a number of Northern Irish courts. 67 Additionally, he had primary
responsibility for promoting English civil law reform, improving civil
procedure, expanding alternative dispute resolution, and providing legal
aid and other legal assistance.68 He also had a growing number of family
law, constitutional, and human rights responsibilities, including primary
ministerial responsibility for human rights, freedom of information, data
protection, and fundamental marriage law.
69
A very important function of the Lord Chancellor affecting justice
was his significant patronage role in the making of judicial appointments
in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland.70 He directly appointed many
full and part-time judges, including civil District Judges sitting in
country courts and Deputy District Judges.71  He also appointed lay
tribunals. See WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 52.
66. Magistrates courts have criminal jurisdiction to hear lesser criminal offences and
civil jurisdiction over a wide variety of matters, including adoption and maintenance
proceedings and liquor licensing. They use both lay justices with no legal qualifications
as well as professional "stipendiary magistrates." See SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 15,
at 104, 128-9. In 1992, the Lord Chancellor's Department acquired oversight
responsibility for the magistrates courts. See BAILEY, supra note 4, at 16. Since the
Second World War, there has been a significant rise in the number of tribunals
established by statute outside the court system. See SLAPPER & KELLY, supra, at 325.
The Lord Chancellor's Department had responsibility for administering many of these
tribunals. See DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra
note 4, at Annex D (containing a full list of all tribunals administered by the Lord
Chancellor).
67. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra note
4, at 28 (including the Supreme Court, the county courts, the magistrates' courts, the
coroners courts, and the Office of Social Security and Child Support Commissioners).
68. Id. at Annex D. The Lord Chancellor is responsible for the Law Commission, an
advisory body that recommends civil law reform to the Government. The Lord
Chancellor oversees the Legal Services Commission that provides citizens with legal
assistance through its Community Legal Service and Criminal Defense Service. He also
authorizes four legal professional bodies to grant their members to conduct litigation or
rights of audience in the courts (the Law Society of England and Wales, the General
Council of the Bar of England and Wales, the Institute of Legal Executives, and the
Chartered Institute of Patent Agents).
69. Id. (noting that in 2001, a variety of constitutional responsibilities were
transferred from the Home Secretary to the Lord Chancellor, including administering the
Oath of Homage to new bishops and archbishops).
70. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 10/03, A NEW WAY
OF APPOINTING JUDGES [hereinafter DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION
PAPER 10/03] 3-10, Annex A (July, 2003); DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS
CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra note 4, at 27-31.
71. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 10/03, supra note
70, at 5. District Judges and Deputy District Judges hear cases in the county courts,
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magistrates in England and Wales, as well as Justices of the Peace in
Northern Ireland.72 He recommended candidates for many other judicial
positions to the Queen for appointment, including High Court judges,
Circuit judges, and Recorders. In practice, this amounted to making
these appointments, since the Queen always accepted his
recommendations. 3 The most senior judges, including Lords of Appeal
in Ordinary, the Heads of Division of the Supreme Court, and Lords
Justices of Appeal were technically appointed by the Queen on the Prime
Minister's recommendation, but in practice the Prime Minister always
sought the advice of the Lord Chancellor before recommending a
candidate.74 The Lord Chancellor's Department ran virtually the entire
judicial appointments process, including advertising available positions,
consulting about candidates, considering applications, interviewing
candidates, deciding who to appoint, and providing feedback to
unsuccessful candidates.75 In addition to appointing judges, the Lord
Chancellor also bore responsibility for dealing with many matters of
judicial discipline and complaints against judges in England, Wales, and
Northern Ireland.76
which have jurisdiction over smaller and less complex civil cases. See SLAPPER &
KELLY, supra note 15, at 104-105, 211. The Lord Chancellor did not directly appoint
District Judges in magistrates courts. See DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS,
CONSULTATION PAPER 10/03, supra, at 4-5.
72. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra note
4, at 14.
73. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 10/03, supra note
70, at 4; WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 134. The High Court hears larger and more
complex civil trials as well as some appeals from magistrates' courts, tribunals, and the
Crown Court, and some actions for judicial review of administrative bodies. Circuit
Judges sit in the Crown Court, which hears serious criminal offenses. They also sit in
county courts to hear civil cases. Recorders are part-time judges who assist Circuit
judges. See SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 15, at 106-109, 146, 211. Also included in
this category of appointments were District Judges in magistrates' courts, Social Security
Commissioners, the Judge Advocate General, and the Judge Advocate of Her Majesty's
Fleet. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 10/03, supra note 70,
at 4.
74. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 10/03, supra note
70, at 3; WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 134.
75. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 10/03, supra note
70, at 10, 22.
76. Id. at 7 100-108; DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER
13/03, supra note 4, at 28 (September, 2003). The Lord Chancellor only had the
statutory power to remove judges of the rank of Circuit Judges or below from office if
they misbehaved or became incapable. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS,
CONSULTATION PAPER 10/03, supra note 70, at 100. It was the responsibility of the
Lord Chancellor to review complaints about the conduct of judges and to decide whether
to warn or reprimand a judge or to remove him or her from office. Id. Judges of the
High Court and above could only be removed from office by the Queen if she has
received a formal address from both houses of Parliament. Id.
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The proposal to abolish the Lord Chancellor did not include
abolishing other members of the executive with some responsibilities for
legal matters, including the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, and
the Home Secretary. Both the Attorney General and Solicitor General,
known together as the Law Officers, straddle the legislative branch of
government since they are also usually members of the House of
Commons, or, more rarely, members of the House of Lords like the
current Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith QC.77 The Home Secretary is
also a member of the House of Commons.
The Attorney General and his deputy, the Solicitor General, are the
Government's primary legal advisers on domestic, international, and
European Community law issues. 78 The Attorney General is also the
head of the Bar of England and Wales, and holds ministerial
responsibility for supervising the Director of Public Prosecutions as head
of the public prosecution service for England and Wales (the Crown
Prosecution Service) and the Director of Public Prosecutions in Northern
Ireland.79 He is also responsible for the Serious Fraud Office, which
investigates and prosecutes complex fraud cases in England, Wales, and
Northern Ireland, and for the Treasury Solicitor's Department, which
carries out legal work for a variety of government departments.80
The Home Secretary is a Cabinet minister who has responsibility for
many areas relating to law and order, including criminal justice,
terrorism, police, prison service, probation service, immigration, asylum,
and criminal law reform. 81 At the time of Blair's announcement in June
2003, the Home Secretary was David Blunkett. Blind since birth,
Blunkett attracted widespread admiration for triumphing over disability
and adversity. But his tenure was marked by controversy over his tough
stance on immigration as well as his efforts to legislate mandatory
77. BAILEY, supra note 4, at 19. Lord Goldsmith QC's webpage is at
http://www.lslo.gov.uk/goldsmith.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2005) (stating that Lord
Goldsmith was appointed Attorney General on June 11, 2001). The current Solicitor-
General, Mike O'Brien QC, MP, appointed on May 9, 2005, is a member of the House of
Commons (Member of Parliament for North Warwickshire). He was formerly Minster of
State for Energy and E-Commerce at the Department of Trade and Industry. Before his
election to Parliament, he practiced as a solicitor. See http://www.lslo.gov.uk/obrien.htm
(last visited Aug. 21, 2005). See also infra note 218 (for a discussion of the meaning of
"QC," the abbreviation for Queen's Counsel).
78. A.W. BRADLEY & K.D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 391
(13th ed. 2003); BAILEY, supra note 4, at 19-23.
79. BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 78, at 392; BAILEY, supra note 4, at 20.
80. BAILEY, supra note 4, at 20.
81. CATHERINE ELLIOTT & FRANCES QUINN, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 451 (4th
ed. 2002); BAILEY, supra note 4, at 19; see also webpage for Charles Clarke MP,
available at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/inside/org/ministers/clarke.html (last visited
Sept. 29, 2005).
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
national identity cards. The controversy ended in scandal in December
2004, when Blunkett resigned after being accused of expediting a visa
application for his former lover's nanny.82 The current Home Secretary
is Blunkett's successor, Charles Clarke, the former Secretary of State for
Education and Skills.
83
B. The Lord Chancellor's Judicial Functions as a Judge and Head of
the Judiciary
At the time of Blair's announcement, the Lord Chancellor also had a
significant judicial role, serving as a senior judge and head of the
judiciary in England and Wales, although not in Northern Ireland or
Scotland.84 The Lord Chancellor was President of the Supreme Court of
Judicature of England and Wales and President of the Chancery
Division.8 5 He was also ex officio judge on the Court of Appeal but
never actually sat as a judge on that court.86 When he chose, he served as
the presiding chairman of the Appellate Committee of the House of
Lords, the final appeals court in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland
and for Scottish civil matters. 87  The Lord Chancellor also normally
82. David Blunkett's Tearful Downfall, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2004, at 14; David
Hughes, All I Want to Do is Hold My Little Boy Again, DAILY MAIL, Dec. 16, 2004, at 2;
George Jones, Tearful Blunkett falls on his sword after e-mail on nanny visa is found
Blair rocked as defiant Home Secretary finally quits Clarke takes over and Ruth Kelly
gets education job, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 16, 2004, at 1; Jason Beattie,
Remarkable ascent of a man who overcame blindness and early loss, EVENING
STANDARD, Dec. 16, 2004, at A6, Mr. Blunkett blows a hole in the Cabinet, EVENING
STANDARD, Dec. 16, 2004, at A13; Philip Webster, End of the Affair, THE TIMES, Dec.
15, 2004, at 1. Blunkett was later named to another Cabinet position as Secretary of State
for Work and Pensions, but had to step down in October 2005 after breaking ministerial
rules by taking a position as a director of DNA Bioscience while out of Cabinet office
without consulting an advisory committee. See Blunkett admits he broke 'sleaze code,'
SUNDAY TIMES, Oct. 30, 2005, at 4.
83. See, e.g., Webster, supra note 82, at 1; Home Secretary Charles Clarke,
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/organisation/ministers/charles-clarke/?version= 1
(stating that Clarke, Member of Parliament for Norwich South, was appointed Home
Secretary in December 2004) (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
84. See BAILEY, supra note 4, at 247-48.
85. Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, §§ 1(2), 5(l)(a) (Eng.). The Supreme Court is
made up of the Court of Appeal, the High Court of Justice, and the Crown Court. The
Chancery Division is one of the three divisions in the High Court. It deals with, inter
alias, property, trusts, insolvency, companies, revenue, and many probate cases. The
other two divisions are the Queen's Bench Division, which hears primarily contract and
tort claims and also has appellate jurisdiction over lower courts and tribunals, and the
Family Division, dealing with, inter alia, divorce, adoption or wardship of children, and
certain non-contentious probate matters. See Supreme Court Act, 1981, c. 54, § 5(l)
(Eng.).
86. Supreme Court Act, 1981, § 2(2)(a).
87. WOODHOUSE, supra note 33 at 104. See also DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 11/03, supra note 15, at 11, 15-17.
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presided over the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, another
House of Lords Committee, with the main functions in 2003 of hearing
appeals from a dwindling number of Commonwealth countries and
Crown Dependencies such as Jersey and Guernsey; hearing devolution
cases referred to it; and determining the legal competence of the
devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.88
Although the Lord Chancellor was a senior judge, there was no
specific requirement that he have any prior judicial experience.89
However, since 1673, all Lord Chancellors have been lawyers. 90 Some
had previous experience as judges, 91 while others did not. For example,
Lord Irvine of Lairg (1997-2003), the Lord Chancellor at the time of
Blair's announcement, had no previous judicial experience, although he
had been a very successful barrister. 92
Lord Chancellors had discretion as to whether to sit as a judge in
particular cases in the House of Lords or Privy Council. Until the
Second World War, many Lord Chancellors frequently sat as judges.93
They were able to do this in conjunction with fulfilling their duties as
Speaker of the House of Lords because the legislative sittings of the
House of Lords did not start until late afternoon, enabling them to attend
judicial hearings scheduled in the morning and early afternoon. 94 This
changed when the wartime bombing of London forced the House of
Lords to stop sitting in the evenings. It rescheduled its legislative sittings
to begin at 2:30 p.m., making it practically impossible for the Lord
Chancellor to attend both judicial and legislative sessions.95 This
scheduling change became permanent after the war's end.
Many postwar Lord Chancellors, such as Lord Gardiner (1964-70),
rarely chose to sit as judges in the House of Lords or the Privy Council
because of scheduling conflicts with legislative sittings as well as
concerns over separation of powers and safeguarding judicial
88. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra note
4, at 11; Fischer, supra note 15, at 110-11; BAILEY, supra note 4, at 126. The Privy
Council also has jurisdiction to hear a number of other appeals from various bodies
which, in the case of several governing bodies for healthcare professions, shifted to the
High Court and Court of Session in 2003. See DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS,
CONSULTATION PAPER 11/03, supra note 15, at 17.
89. See SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 15, at 199.
90. See WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 9.
91. Prominent examples of twentieth-century Lord Chancellors with significant prior
judicial experience are Lord Sankey (1929-35), Lord Maugham (1938-39), and Lord
Simonds (1951-54). Lord Mackay of Clashfern (1987-1997) served as a Scottish judge
before being named a Law Lord in 1984.
92. See SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 15, at 199.
93. See WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 116.
94. See id.
95. See HAILSHAM,SUpra note 29, at 378.
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independence. 96 But two long-serving Lord Chancellors at the end of the
twentieth century, Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone (1970-1974, 1979-
1987) and Lord Mackay of Clashfern (1987-1997), sat as judges more
frequently. 97 Lord Hailsham sat as a judge for twenty-eight days in his
first term as Lord Chancellor and for fifty-three days in his second,
hearing an average of three to four cases per year.98 Lord Mackay tried
to hear six to eight cases a year. He nearly achieved this goal, averaging
almost five cases per year and sitting for a total of sixty days over the
course of his term of office as Lord Chancellor.99 Lord Hailsham
defended his choice to sit as a judge on the grounds that it would ensure
that "a politically motivated prime minister does not give the office to a
no-good lawyer." 100  He also found the judicial role to be personally
fulfilling, and described sitting as a judge as "[t]he part of the Lord
Chancellor's function I most enjoyed."''
Lord Mackay argued that "[s]itting gives the Lord Chancellor a
practical awareness of the development of the common law at the highest
level. It enables him to assess the quality of the most senior
advocates."'' 0 2 Additionally, he suggested that "[i]t is just possible that
the Lord Chancellor may himself have a contribution to make."'1
0 3
Although Lord Irvine of Lairg (1997-2003), Lord Mackay's successor,
sat as a judge less frequently than Lord Mackay and Lord Hailsham, he
agreed that Lord Chancellors should sit as judges, once saying: "[b]oth
my predecessors... attached real importance to the Lord Chancellor
sitting in the Chair [in the House of Lords]. So do I.,'
104
Most Lord Chancellors accepted some limitations on their rights to
sit as judges based on the need to protect judicial independence and the
right to a fair trial, as well as the importance of preserving public
confidence in the legal system. Lord Chancellors have usually refrained
96. See BAILEY, supra note 4, at 248; HAILSHAM, supra note 29, at 379; UNDERHILL,
supra note 4, at 197.
97. See BAILEY, supra note 4, at 248.
98. Lord Alexander of Weedon QC et al., The Judicial Functions of the House of
Lords, Written Evidence to the Royal Commission on Reform of the House of Lords by a
Justice Working Party [hereinafter Justice Working Party] I I n.23 (May 19, 1999),
available at http://www.justice.org.uk/images/pdfs/hol.pdf; see also WOODHOUSE, supra
note 33, at 117-118 (warning that statistics vary as to the total time spent hearing cases by
some of the earlier postwar depending on what sources are consulted. This may lead to
misleading conclusions on the relative frequency of sitting by different Lord Chancellors,
unless their different political and judicial circumstances are taken into account).
99. Justice Working Party, supra note 98, at 11 n.23.
100. HAILSHAM, supra note 29, at 379.
101. Id. at 433.
102. 597 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1999), col. 736 (speech of Lord Irvine of Lairg).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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from hearing cases in which the government has a direct interest.,
0 5
Some commentators have argued that it is also inappropriate for the Lord
Chancellor to hear cases in which the government has an indirect
interest, such as criminal appeals, but the three most recent Lord
Chancellors at the time of Blair's announcement did not accept any such
broad restrictions on their discretion to sit as judges.10 6  Both Lord
Hailsham and Lord Mackay heard criminal appeals.10 7 Lord Irvine stated
to the House of Lords that he was "unwilling to lay down any detailed
rules" for when the Lord Chancellor should not sit as a judge, other than
to pledge that he would not sit on "any appeal where the Government
might reasonably appear to have a stake in a particular outcome.1 0 8
Lord Irvine favored a case-by-case approach because
it is ever a question of judgment combined with a need to ensure that
no party to an appeal could reasonably believe or suspect that the
Lord Chancellor might, because of his other roles, have an interest in
a specific outcome. Examples might be where the lawfulness of a
decision or action by any Minister or department might be at issue.1
9
As a result, according to Lord Irvine, "there is no category of cases that
could be labeled 'constitutional' which should be 'no-go areas' for the
Lord Chancellor." 0
When serving as a judge, the Lord Chancellor was not supposed to
act as a member of the Government, despite the fact that he was a
Cabinet minister, and, like all English judges, was required to be
independent and unbiased in accordance with his judicial oath.11 But,
unlike other senior judges, he did not have security of tenure, since he
served at the pleasure of a Prime Minister who could dismiss him at
will. 12 As if the task of keeping these judicial and executive roles
105. See WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 123 (citing, as an example of a case heard by
a Lord Chancellor in which the government had a direct interest, Attorney-General v.
County Council of the West Riding of Yorkshire [1907] A.C. 29 (leading judgment
delivered by the then Lord Chancellor Lord Lorebum (1905-1912) (involving the issue of
whether the Education Act 1902 obliged local education authorities to pay teachers for
time spent on religious education that was "lawfully given during school hours.")).
106. Id. at 124.
107. Id.
108. 597 PARE. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1999), col. 736 (speech of Lord Irvine of Lairg).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 104.
112. See SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 15, at 198. Senior judges of the High Court
and above have greater security of tenure than the Lord Chancellor, holding office
"during good behaviour" up to the retirement age of 70 that was instituted by the Judicial
Pensions and Retirement Act 1993, effective in April 1995. See Supreme Court Act,
1981, c. 54, §§ 11(2), 11(3) (Eng.) and Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict, c.
59, § 6 (Eng.), as amended.
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separate was not a sufficient challenge for one person, the Lord
Chancellor also wore another hat, both literally and figuratively, in his
legislative role as member and ex officio speaker of the House of
Lords.'13
C. The Lord Chancellor's Legislative Role
The Lord Chancellor was under a duty to ordinarily preside over the
House of Lords as Speaker unless it was in Committee. 114 Dressed in a
seventeenth-century full-bottomed wig and a black robe with gold lace
embroidery, he arrived at sittings of the House of Lords in a formal
procession from his official residence in the Palace of Westminster.
1 5
The procession also included several other royal officials in ceremonial
attire. The Deputy-Serjeant-at-Arms or Principal Doorkeeper, who
carried a ceremonial Mace, and the Purse-Bearer, bearing a large
embroidered purse, marched ahead of the Lord Chancellor. 16 The Train-
Bearer followed the Lord Chancellor. The Gentleman Usher of the
Black Rod joined the end of the procession as it passed through the
Prince's Chamber, a relatively small but sumptuous room, its walls lined
with colorful portraits of various Tudor princes and princesses.' 1' After
113. See DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra
note 4, at 16; see also HILAIRE BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
103 (5th ed. 2004). Technically, the House of Lords has no speaker, but by tradition, the
Lord Chancellor usually presides over debates as the most senior member. His powers
are not as broad as the Speaker of the House of Commons in that he does not rule on
points of order or discipline; the entire House does that. HEUSTON 1940-1970, supra note
29, at 13; Companion to the Standing Orders of the House of Lords 4.01 (2003)
[hereafter House of Lords Companion], available at http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld/ldcomp/compso.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). As a
result of this self-regulation of the House of Lords, the Lord Chancellor's only real power
as Speaker was to bring time-limited debates to an end and to announce his opinion of the
result of any vote. HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON SPEAKERSHIP OF THE HOUSE
OF LORDS, FIRST REPORT, Nov. 18, 2003, 2002-2003 Session, H.L. Paper 199, at 12.
114. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra note
4, at 16; see also House of Lords Standing Order No. 18, Speaker of the House (June 9,
1660), available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld/ldstords/
ldso--d.htm# 18. If the Lord Chancellor were absent, this 1660 standing order provides
that his place as Speaker should be taken either by a Deputy Speaker, authorized under
the Great Seal from the Queen or by a Deputy Chairman, appointed by the House of
Lords, or if neither of those two were present, by a person selected by the Lords
themselves. See id. at 18.
115. House of Lords Companion, supra note 113, at 3.04 (2003). The House of
Lords is located in another part of the Palace of Westminster. See Parliament website,
Explore the Houses of Parliament, http://www.explore.parliament.uk/
Parliament.aspx?id=7 (last visited Mar. 25, 2005).
116. House of Lords Companion, supra note 113, at footnote 94. A mace is an
ancient weapon, basically an improved club consisting of a long rod with a thicker head
that was often spiked or flanged to inflict greater damage and pierce armor.
117. Id; The Palace of Westminster, A Guide for Young People 7 ["hereinafter Palace
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the procession entered the House of Lords Chamber, the official carrying
the Mace placed it on the Woolsack, a rectangular sack stuffed with wool
that had a red cover.1 18 Only after a Bishop had led the House in prayer,
and the Lord Chancellor had taken his seat on the Woolsack, could the
business of the House commence.1 19
The convention of sitting on the Woolsack evokes the historic
importance of wool to the British economy, and, perhaps more
significantly for the purposes of this article, represents respect for the
constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers. 120  Unlike the
Speaker of the House of Commons, the Lord Chancellor was not
expected to remain nonpartisan and, if a peer, could participate in debate
as a Government spokesman.12 1 All modem Lord Chancellors after Sir
Thomas More (1529-33) received a peerage if not already the holder of
one.122 But if the Lord Chancellor wanted to speak in debate, he had to
rise from the Woolsack (which, as a technical matter, is outside the
House of Lords), remove his wig and gown, and move to a spot a few
paces away that King Henry VIII had selected. 123 If the Lord Chancellor
failed to rise from the Woolsack, his words were treated only as advisory
and would not be formally recorded.
124
The Woolsack has the appearance of being an uncomfortable seat.
It has no back or sides like a conventional chair, other than a little
backrest. 125 But the Woolsack caused Lord Irvine no discomfort. In
March 1998, he assured the House of Commons Select Committee on
Public Administration that "[t]he Woolsack, contrary to what you might
think, is quite comfortable and not a bad place for a speaker to sit, in case
you have been worrying about me, which I am sure you have not.
'26
of Westminster Guide"], available at http://www.explore.parliament.uk/cms/
DocumentUploads/palaceofwestminster.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
118. Id. at 9-10 (includes photographs of the Woolsack).
119. House of Lords Companion, supra note 113, at 3.04.
120. See United Kingdom Parliament, An Introduction to Parliament, "Woolsack,"
available at http://www.parliament.uk/works/locomp.cfm#woolsack (noting that King
Edward III (1327-77) originally introduced the Woolsack, then stuffed with English
wool, as a symbol of the source of English prosperity, but that it is now stuffed with wool
from every Commonwealth country as a symbol of unity) (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
121. HEUSTON, LIVES 1940-1970, supra note 29, at 3; WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at
101.
122. HEUSTON, LIVES 1940-1970, supra note 29 at 13; WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at
101.
123. See House of Lords Precedence Act, 1539, 31 Hen. 8, c. 10 § 4; see also House
of Lords Standing Order 19, The Lord Chancellor (Mar. 27, 1621), available at:
http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld/ldstords/lds-.htm#19;
WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 101.
124. See HEUSTON, LIVES 1940-1970, supra note 29, at 14.
125. See HEUSTON, LivEs 1885-1940, supra note 29, at xvii.
126. HOUSE OF COMMONS SELECT COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, MINUTES
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Nevertheless, Irvine doggedly sought to reduce the amount of time that
he had to spend on the Woolsack. This was because he found wearing
the Lord Chancellor's heavy wig and ceremonial robes to be extremely
burdensome as daily working garb.'2 7
In 1998, Lord Irvine proposed that he should be allowed to spend
more time off the Woolsack and behind the dispatch box while leading
debate on government bills, rather than just during the committee
stage. 128 This procedural change would permit him to spend less time
wearing the uncomfortable wig and robes. Lord Irvine also proposed
that he be permitted to replace the Lord Chancellor's traditional
breeches, tights, and buckled shoes with ordinary black trousers and
black shoes on non-ceremonial occasions. He promised that he would
keep the shoes highly polished. 29 Some Labour politicians agreed that
the Lord Chancellor should spend less time in "fancy dress."'130 Jeremy
Corbyn, the Member of Parliament for Islington North, commented that
anyone who went out in public dressed like the Lord Chancellor would
risk arrest.13 ' Eventually, the House of Lords, following the
recommendation of its Select Committee on Procedure, agreed that Lord
Irvine should be allowed to speak as a Government Minister from the
Government Front Benches when the House was sitting as a House, not
just when it was sat in committee, and permitted him to dispense with the
traditional requirement of wearing breeches, tights and silver buckled
shoes other than on ceremonial occasions. 1
32
OF EVIDENCE, Question 422 (Mar. 3, 1998), available at http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm I 99798/cmselect/cmpubadm/398-v/398v 0.htm.
127. Id. at 422-424 (Lord Irvine stated that "[t]he wig, however, is
uncomfortable .... When his interrogator solicitously enquired: "Could you sit on the
wig perhaps?," Lord Irvine responded: "I do not think I would sit on the wig. It is far too
beautiful and historic an object to do it the great damage I would do it if I sat on it!").
128. See The Lord Chancellor's New Clothes, BBC NEWS, Nov. 16, 1998,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/213250.stm.
129. See HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURE, FOURTH REPORT, Oct.
13, 1998, 1997-1998 Session, H.L. Paper 144 [hereafter HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT
COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURE FOURTH REPORT], available at http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ldl 99798/ldselect/ldprohse/144/14402.htm; see also 594 PARL.
DEn., H.L. (5th ser.) (1998), cols. 985, 1006.
130. See, e.g., Off with his tights, THE MIRROR, Nov. 17, 1998, at 4 (quoting Lord
Haskell as stating that if reforms were not made to the Lord Chancellor's dress, "we shall
be perceived as part of theme park Britain.").
131. See Lord Chancellor angry over wigs, BBC NEWS, Nov. 10, 1998,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk-politics/211654.stm.
132. See HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURE FOURTH REPORT, supra
note 129; see also 594 PARE. DEB., H.L. (5 th ser.) (1998), cols. 983-1017 (agreeing to
Lord Irvine's proposals by a vote of 145-114 to reject an amendment, proposed by Earl
Ferrers, to a motion to agree to the Fourth Report of the Select Committee on Procedure
that would have exempted the proposed changes to the Lord Chancellor's dress).
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D. Miscellaneous Responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor
As well as his executive, judicial, and legislative roles, by the
twenty-first century the Lord Chancellor had also acquired a large variety
of other miscellaneous responsibilities. Among these were various
ecclesiastical functions, including the centuries-old patronage function of
appointing Anglican priests to a number of parish livings and cathedral
canonries; 133 exercising visitorial, or supervisory, jurisdiction at dozens
of academic and charitable institutions (which required the Lord
Chancellor to, among other things, adjudicate certain disputes between
students and universities); 134 providing advice to the Sovereign on the
"Royal Peculiars" (which are places of worship outside normal
ecclesiastical jurisdiction that include Westminster Abbey and the
Chapels Royal); 135 and various other charitable responsibilities, including
making appointments to the governing bodies of such venerable public
schools as Charterhouse, Harrow, and Rugby, as well as those of other
schools and charitable institutions like the London School of Hygiene
and Tropical Medicine. 136  The Lord Chancellor's Department also
funded and supervised a variety of government bodies, such as the Land
Registry, the Law Commission for England and Wales, the Official
Solicitor and Public Trustees Office, and the Public Guardianship
Office. 137 Additionally, the Lord Chancellor still retained his traditional
responsibility as Keeper of the Great Seal of the Realm.' 
38
E. The Lord Chancellor's Constitutional Responsibility to Preserve
Judicial Independence.
Lord Hailsham said that of all the responsibilities of the Lord
Chancellor, his "most important constitutional function... remains to
preserve the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary against all
comers."'139 To Americans, it may seem odd for the Lord Chancellor to
have a constitutional responsibility because the United Kingdom has no
written constitution or bill of rights. Of course, as the scholar Jeremy
Waldron has pointed out, the absence of a written constitution does not
mean that there is no British constitution.140 The British constitutional
133. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra note
4, at 7 34-41, 45-49.
134. Id. at 50-58, Annex H.
135. Id. at 65-67.
136. Id. at 69-74.
137. Id. at Annex D (containing a full list of bodies that were supervised or funded
through the Lord Chancellor's Department).
138. Id. at 20-21.
139. HAILSHAM, supra note 29, at 385.
140. JEREMY WALDRON, THE LAW (THEORY AND PRACTICE IN BRITISH POLITICS) 61-2
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system is based on unwritten conventions: custom and practice that are
tacitly understood to be obligatory.
As a matter of political theory, the fundamental principles of the
rule of law and the separation of powers support judicial independence.
In the view of the famous nineteenth-century British constitutional
theorist A.V. Dicey, the rule of law afforded constitutional protections
that he believed to be lacking in continental Europe. 14 1 To Dicey, the
rule of law consisted of three elements: limits on the arbitrary power of
the State, equality before the law, and the supremacy of ordinary law.
142
Many other political theorists, such as F.A. von Hayek and Joseph Raz,
have offered further refinements on the doctrine of the rule of law, but
these theorists have generally agreed that the rule of law helps to
minimize the danger of arbitrary governmental power. 1
43
The doctrine of the separation of powers has its origins in the
writings of seventeenth and eighteenth century English and French
writers, 144 including Locke 145 and Montesquieu. 146 Writing at the very
end of the seventeenth century, Locke was particularly concerned about
judicial independence, which he viewed as fundamental to the social
contract that he believed to be the basis of political societies. In his
famous Second Essay Concerning Civil Government, Locke wrote:
For he being supposed to have all, both legislative and executive,
power in himself alone, there is no judge to be found, no appeal lies
open to any one, who may fairly and indifferently and with authority
decide, and from whence relief and redress may be expected of any
injury or inconveniency that may be suffered from him, or by his
order. 47
Montesquieu's eighteenth century writings exemplify the classic
doctrine of separation of powers, which seeks to protect against abuse of
governmental power by dividing government both structurally and
(1990).
141. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
110-119 (Liberty Classics 1982) (8th ed. 1915).
142. Id. at 120-21.
143. See F.A. VON HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 205-219 (1960); Joseph
Raz, The Rule of Law and its Virtue, 93 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 195 (1977).
144. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 83, 87
(2d ed. 1998) (noting that Montesquieu was influenced by the English writers Locke and
Bolingbroke).
145. JOHN LOCKE, CONCERNING CIVIL GOVERNMENT, SECOND ESSAY (Charles L.
Sherman ed., Encyclopedia Britannica 1952) (1690).
146. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (Thomas Nugent trans.,
Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952) (1748).
147. LOCKE, supra note 145, at Ch. VII 91.
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functionally into executive, legislative, and judicial branches.14 8 In The
Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu wrote:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same
person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty;
because apprehension may arise, lest the same monarch or senate
should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated
from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to
arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it
joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence
• 149
and oppression.
Montesquieu's views on the separation of powers are at least
somewhat familiar to most Americans, because his writings had such a
profound influence on some of the American Founders. For example,
James Madison wrote: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or
many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny."'150 Madison's interpretation
of Montesquieu was that the separation of powers did not require the
three branches of government to be completely separate and distinct, but
rather that no one branch could exercise total control over another.'
5
'
It has often been said that Montesquieu based his theory of
separation of powers on his observations of the English political system
while visiting England in 1729.152 If that was actually the case, he must
have misunderstood the system. 153 Eighteenth-century England was not
in fact a paradigm of separation of powers. 154 The fundamental English
constitutional doctrine of parliamentary supremacy conflicts with the
separation of powers doctrine formulated by Montesqiueu and Madison,
regardless of whether this requires a pure separation of powers (in that
judicial, executive, and legislative functions must be exercised by
separate persons or bodies, as in the current French system of
government) or only a partial separation of powers (like the system of
checks and balances in the current United States system of
148. See VILE, supra note 144, at 83 (noting that Montesquieu's thinking on
separation of powers was not completely original, but had great influence).
149. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 146, at Book XI 6.
150. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 at 153 (Encyclopedia Britannica 1952) (1787).
151. Id. at 154.
152. TOMKrNs, supra note 61, at 37 n.5.
153. For a theory that Montesquieu was basing his theory on an ideal English system
rather than the reality, see VILE, supra note 144, at 93.
154. See, e.g., ERIC BARENDT, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 14, 34-35
(1998).
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government). 155  Dicey defined parliamentary supremacy as giving
Parliament "the right to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further,
that no person or body is recognized by the law of England as having a
right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament."'
156
Since the doctrine of separation of powers makes the legislative
branch superior to the other branches of government, the extent to which
the doctrine of separation of powers actually operated in the United
Kingdom at the time of Blair's announcement in 2003 was debatable.
There was structural and functional fusion between the branches of
government. The Lord Chancellor's participation in all three branches
was only one example. Another example was the highest court of
appeals, a committee of the upper house of the legislature, the House of
Lords, where the judges had the right to participate in and vote on
political debates. 157 Aware of the problem that this posed for separation
of powers and judicial independence, the Law Lords made a formal
statement in 2000 that they would not participate in debates or votes
where there was "a strong element of party political controversy; and
secondly,.., bear in mind that they might render themselves ineligible
to sit judicially if they were to express an opinion on a matter which
might later be relevant to an appeal to the House."' 158  Still another
inconsistency with the doctrine of separation of powers was the fact that
every Minister in the executive was also a member of one of the Houses
of Parliament and, under the doctrine of ministerial responsibility,
collectively and individually responsible to Parliament. 59
Notwithstanding these and many other examples of fusion between
the branches of government in the British constitutional system, some
modem constitutional theorists, including T.R.S. Allen and Eric Barendt,
have argued that the idea of the separation of powers is still
fundamentally important for the British constitutional system.160 Barendt
155. Id. at 14-17, 35.
156. DICEY, supra note 141, at 3-4.
157. BAILEY, supra note 4, at 272.
158. 614 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2000), col. 419 (statement of Lord Bingham, to
which all Lords of Appeal in Ordinary agreed, on Recommendation 59 of the Royal
Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords).
159. See BARENDT, supra note 154, at 36; see also ToMKINS, supra note 61, at 49-50.
160. See, e.g., BARENDT, supra note 154, at 17, 34-40 (arguing that the separation of
powers is such an important safeguard for "guaranteeing limited government" that it
should be given priority over he doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty); Eric Barendt,
Separation of Powers and Constitutional Government, PUBLIC LAW 599 (1995) (arguing
that important constitutional values are promoted by the principle of separation of
powers, especially the "partial separation" version of this concept, and consequently it
should be better respected in the United Kingdom constitutional system and taken more
seriously by British constitutional scholars, commentators, and courts); T.R.S. Allen, Law
Liberty and the Separation of Powers, in T.R.S. ALLEN, LAW, LIBERTY, AND JUSTICE: THE
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saw the fused functions of the Lord Chancellor as the product of a
different concept of separation of powers than the eighteenth century
formulations of Montesquieu and Madison. In Barendt's view, these
derived from a seventeenth-century idea of separation of powers between
the Crown and Parliament that was designed to render the Crown
accountable to Parliament. 161
Some of those who agreed with Barendt and Allen that the
separation of powers was vitally important to the British system of
government viewed the Lord Chancellor as the primary defender of the
doctrine, despite the obvious problem that he exercised functions in all
three branches of government. For example, Lord Woolf expressed this
view in a 1998 speech delivered at All Souls College, Oxford, while he
was still Master of the Rolls: 1
62
As a member of the Cabinet, he [the Lord Chancellor] can act as
advocate on behalf of the courts and the justice system. He can
explain to his colleagues in the Cabinet the proper significance of a
decision which they regard as being distasteful in consequence of an
application for judicial review. He can, as a member of the
Government, ensure that the courts are properly resourced. On the
other hand, on behalf of the Government, he can explain to the
judiciary the realities of the political situation and the constraints on
the resources which they must inevitably accept.'
63
Admitting that "no one would today give the Lord Chancellor his huge
responsibilities," Lord Woolf added:
As long as the Lord Chancellor is punctillious in keeping his separate
roles distinct, the separation of powers is not undermined and the
justice system benefits immeasurably. The justice system is better
served by having the head of the judiciary at the centre of
government than it would be by having its interests represented by a
Minister of Justice who would lack these other roles. T
Woolf also stated that "the Lord Chancellor of the day can act as a safety
valve avoiding undue tension between the judiciary and the Government
LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALIsM 48, 50, 68-69 (1993) (arguing that
separation of powers is of "crucial importance ... to the maintenance of the rule of law";
also contending that there must be some limits on legislative supremacy in the British
system for it to satisfy the demands of the rule of law).
161. See TOMKINS, supra note 61, at 46.
162. The Master of the Rolls is the most senior judge on the Court of Appeal. See
SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 15, at 110.
163. Lord Woolf, Judicial Review: The tensions between the executive and the
Judiciary (revised version of the inaugural Neill Lecture delivered at the University of
Oxford on Nov. 6, 1997), 114 LAW Q. REv. 579, 582 (1998).
164. 1d.
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and possibly between the judiciary and Parliament as well. 65
Many late twentieth-century Lord Chancellors agreed with Lord
Woolf that the Lord Chancellor served as a crucial safeguard of
separation of powers. Lord Hailsham believed that the Lord Chancellor
better protected the separation of powers than a paper constitution. He
described the task of protecting the separation of powers as the "primary
constitutional function of the Lord Chancellor, a task he can only fulfill
if he sits somewhere near the apex of the constitutional pyramid, armed
with a long barge pole to keep off marauding craft from any quarter."'' 66
He admitted that this was far from an easy task, noting: "In theory, of
course, everyone is in favor of judicial independence in the same way as
they are in favour of virtue and against vice. But in practice this is far
from the case."' 167  Lord Irvine also shared this view that the Lord
Chancellor functioned to protect judicial independence:
The value of a Lord Chancellor is that he upholds judicial
independence and can mediate between the executive and judiciary
when need be. The judiciary has a representative in the Cabinet, and
the Cabinet in the judiciary. The Lord Chancellor can also speak to
the public on behalf of the judges, in a way that professional judges
themselves cannot. The office of Lord Chancellor is the guarantor of
judicial independence in our constitution. It holds the different parts
together, and withstands pressure from all sides.1
68
Similarly, Lord Mackay stated that "the existence of the Lord Chancellor
provides a necessary link between Parliament and the executive on the
one hand and the judges on the other" and also has said that "the Lord
Chancellor is able also to represent the interests and viewpoint of a judge
within the executive."'
169
IV. Previous Reform Efforts Based on "Internal" and "External"
Concerns About the Lord Chancellor
The view of the Lord Chancellor as the primary defender of
separation of powers has long had many detractors. There has been
165. Id.
166. Lord Hailsham, The Problems of a Lord Chancellor (Holdsworth Lecture 1972),
in THE LAWYER AND JUSTICE 234 (Brian W. Harvey ed. 1978).
167. HAILSHAM, supra note 29, at 385.
168. LORD IRVINE OF LAIRG, Judicial Independence and the British Constitution, in
HUMAN RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL
SYSTEM 206 (2003). Lord Irvine gave two examples to support his belief that the office
of Lord Chancellor protected judicial independence: the respected system of judicial
appointments and the fact that the Lord Chancellor, as a Minister, was accountable to the
public. Id. at 206-07.
169. Mackay, supra note 31, at 250-51.
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criticism of the multifaceted role of the Lord Chancellor for hundreds of
years. As well as "internal" concerns that the office breached separation
of powers and failed to protect judicial independence, critics voiced
doubts as to whether the Lord Chancellor's office was "externally"
consistent with the appearance of justice. There have also been questions
about the ability of any one man, however energetic and talented he may
be, to successfully carry out so many functions simultaneously. Many
calls for reform have come from the holders of the office themselves.
Faced with a Dickensian backlog of Chancery work, a number of
nineteenth-century Lord Chancellors proposed reforms. In the mid-
nineteenth century, the radical Lord Brougham (1830-34), who was
primarily concerned about overwork, put forward some rather vague
suggestions to sever the various roles of the Lord Chancellor and
introduce a Ministry of Justice. 170  These suggestions were never
implemented, no doubt at least in part due to Brougham's unstable
temperament. The constitutional commentator Walter Bagehot
commented of Brougham that "if he were a horse, no-one would buy
him."'' In 1836, Lord Cottingham (1836-41, 1846-50), sharing
Brougham's concerns about excessive workload, introduced a bill that
would have reduced the responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor by
transferring his duty to preside over the Court of Chancery to a different
judge, but this met with resounding defeat on Second Reading in the
House of Lords. 72 Despite the failure of Lord Cottingham's Bill, its
proposals were eventually implemented. The Lord Chancellor ceased to
sit as a judge of first instance with the enactment of the Judicature Acts
of 1873 and 1875, legislation that was the work of the Lord Chancellors
Lord Cairns (1868, 1874-80) and Lord Selborne (1872-74 and 1880-
85).173 Later in the nineteenth century, the idealistic Lord Westbury
(1861-65) advocated many radical reforms, including the introduction of
a Department of Justice to promote his Justinian-like goal of
rationalizing the law by digesting and codifying it. 174 But Westbury
never realized his dreams because he was hampered by a lack of talent
for diplomacy as well as by a spendthrift son.
175
In the early twentieth century, Lord Haldane (1912-15, 1924) also
pressed for reforms to the office of Lord Chancellor in his role as
170. UNDERHILL, SUpra note 4, at 174-75, 177-78.
171. Id. at 174-75.
172. 1 LORD BIRKENHEAD, POINTS OF VIEW 93 (1922) (noting that Lord Campbell,
then serving as Attorney-General who would later serve as Lord Chancellor from 1859-
61, also supported this bill).
173. Id. at 94, 99; UNDERHILL, supra note 4, at 181.
174. ATLAY, supra note 29, at 283.
175. Id.; UNDERHILL, supra note 4, at 185.
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chairman of a committee appointed by the then Prime Minister Lloyd
George on the Machinery of Government.1 76  This committee was
charged with enquiring into the responsibilities of the various
departments in the central executive government and advising on how
various government offices should better exercise and distribute their
functions. 177  Its 1918 report, the Haldane Report, found that
"[s]uccessive holders [of the office of Lord Chancellor] have testified
that it is beyond the work of any one man to perform the work that ought
to be done," and voiced concern about political pressures on the office.
178
Despite these concerns, the Haldane Report did not advocate abolishing
the office of Lord Chancellor. While disclaiming that this conclusion
was motivated by sentiment, the report emphasized the great antiquity
and historical significance of the office, which was "deeply rooted in the
traditions of the nation."'
179
The Haldane Report contained a set of proposals that would have
drastically reduced the Lord Chancellor's functions. In a section that
Lord Haldane himself drafted, it recommended that the Lord Chancellor
cease to sit as Speaker in the House of Lords and should no longer sit
frequently as a judge in ordinary cases, although he should not be
entirely barred from all judicial duties. 180  Haldane wrote that it was
desirable for the Lord Chancellor to provide the benefit of his
parliamentary experience by judging occasional cases involving
"delicate" constitutional issues in the House of Lords or Privy Council. '
8 1
The Haldane Report also proposed a radical shift of many
responsibilities for judicial administration away from the Lord
Chancellor, although it recommended that he continue to serve as the
primary constitutional adviser to the Crown, and also that he "watch and
master all questions relating to legislation."'182  Moreover, the Lord
Chancellor should also continue to make judicial appointments, but to
keep him free of "any suggestion of political influence," he should first
176. MINISTRY OF RECONSTRUCTION, REPORT OF THE MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT
COMMITTEE, Cd. 9230 at 4 (1918) [hereafter "HALDANE REPORT"]. See also HEUSTON,
LIVES 1885-1940, supra note 29, at 227-28. C.H. WILSON, HALDANE AND THE MACHINERY
OF GOVERNMENT (1956); Gavin Drewry, Lord Haldane 's Ministry of Justice: Stillborn or
Strangled at Birth, 61 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 396 (Winter, 1983); Gavin Drewry, The
Debate About a Ministry of Justice: A Joad 's-Eye View, PUBLIC LAW 502 (1987).
177. HALDANE REPORT, supra note 176, at 4. See also STEVENS, supra note 58, at 25
(describing the Committee as "in some ways, a canard," set up to occupy Lord Haldane
after his removal from the War Office as a result of unfair accusations of pro-German
sympathies).
178. HALDANE REPORT, supra note 176, at 73.
179. Id. at 72.
180. Id. at 73; See HEUSTON, LIVES 1885-1940, supra note 29, at 228.
181. HALDANE REPORT, supra note 176, at 73.
182. Id. at 74.
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be required to consult a judicial appointments committee that would
include the Prime Minister and a new Minister of Justice.183 Other
matters of judicial administration should be shifted to the Minister of
Justice, who would take over the Home Secretary's role as administrator
of the criminal justice system and assume various other responsibilities
of the Home Secretary.
1 84
The Haldane Report's proposals for reform to the office of Lord
Chancellor met with considerable opposition, including from the English
Bar, and were never implemented. 185 One of the report's fiercest critics
was Lord Haldane's successor as Lord Chancellor, Lord Birkenhead
(1919-1922), who published a powerfully worded attack on the proposals
for a Ministry of Justice in a 1922 collection of essays, Points of View.
While admitting that "[p]robably in an ideal world, no one would have
constructed the office of Lord Chancellor exactly as it is," Lord
Birkenhead contended that the office of Lord Chancellor in fact served to
strengthen separation of powers. He wrote:
In every democracy there arise from time to time occasions of
jealousy and difficulty between the judiciary and the executive. Our
present system, under which the head of the judiciary is also a
prominent member of the executive Government, has its
disadvantages. But it has this great advantage-that it provides a link
between the two sets of institutions; if they are totally severed there
will disappear with them any controlling or suggestive force exterior
to the Judges themselves, and it is difficult to believe that there is no
necessity for the existence of such a personality, imbued on the one
hand with legal ideas and habits of thought, and aware on the other of
the problems which engage the attention of the executive
Government. In the absence of such a person the judiciary and the
executive are likely to drift asunder to the point of a violent
separation, followed by a still more violent and disastrous
collision. 186
Despite the failure of Lord Haldane's proposals, the debate about
183. Id. at 73-74.
184. Id. at 74-78.
185. BARLEY, supra note 4, at 35.
186. BIRKENHEAD, supra note 172, at 112-13, 127 (1922). This essay, though
published under Lord Birkenhead's name, was probably drafted by Sir Claud Schuster,
the Permanent Secretary to the Lord Chancellor and a determined opponent of the
Haldane Report's proposals. See Drewry, supra note 176, at 406 (Stillborn); Gavin
Drewry, Ministry of Justice-A Matter of Meaning, 132 NEW LAW JOURNAL 602 (June 24,
1982). Gavin Drewry has criticized Lord Birkenhead's essay for attacking positions that
the Haldane Report had not taken, such as the abolition of the Lord Chancellor as well as
his function in appointing new judges. Id. at 603; Drewry, supra note 176, at 407
(Stillborn).
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whether the Lord Chancellor's office should be reformed never really
ceased, and calls for change continued.187 In the 1990s, the introduction
of a Ministry of Justice to replace many of the functions of the Lord
Chancellor and the Home Office was official party policy of both the
Labour and Liberal Democrat parties. 188 Pressure for reform intensified
at the end of the millennium, based primarily on two areas of concern.
This article will refer to the first type of concern as "internal"
because it involved a domestic issue, namely whether Lord Chancellor
was fulfilling his constitutional duty of preserving judicial independence
and respect for separation of powers. In contrast, the second type of
concern centered on outside perceptions of the British constitutional
system. The focus of this "external" concern was whether the
multifaceted role of the Lord Chancellor appeared to promote the goals
of judicial independence and separation of powers (whether or not it
actually did so in practice). A similar concern over whether justice is
publicly observed has been highlighted by the United States Supreme
187. See e.g., JUSTICE, Do WE NEED A MINISTRY OF JUSTICE? (1970); Drewry, supra
note 186, at 602 (listing various calls for a Ministry of Justice); Drewry, supra note 176
at 502 n. 1 (Joad's Eye View) (enumerating various proposals for a Ministry of Justice
made before the 1987 General Election); Steyn, supra note 58 at 89-91 (arguing that it is
no longer appropriate for the Lord Chancellor, a Cabinet Minister, to be head of the
judiciary and to sit as a judge in the House of Lords and Privy Council); Woodhouse,
supra note 58 [1998 article in PUBLIC LAW], at 617-632 (criticizing "the pretence that the
position of the Lord Chancellor, as currently understood, is fundamental to our
constitutional arrangements," and contending that "[tihe constitutional and political
position of the Lord Chancellor is difficult to defend" because "[h]is cross-institutional
role neither accords with the separation of powers nor presents a rational protection for
judicial independence"); Memorandum from Sarah Spencer, Institute for Public Policy
Research, remodeling government, Issue: Future of the Home Office and the Lord
Chancellor's Department 1, 12-17 (April 2, 2001) (on file with author) (expressing
concern about (i) overlapping functions between the Home Office and the Lord
Chancellor's Department, (ii) the Lord Chancellor's lack of accountability, and (iii) the
danger that the current functions of the Lord Chancellor fail to adequately protect judicial
independence; also advocating the replacement of the Lord Chancellor's Department with
a Department for Justice and Equality, the appointment of a member of the House of
Commons as the next Lord Chancellor, and the appointment of an independent Judicial
Appointments Commission); Nony Ardill, From LCD to a Department of Justice?,
LEGAL ACTION 1-4 (August 2001) (advocating the exploration "as a matter of urgency
[of] the creation of a Department of Justice, together with an independent judicial
appointments commission"); WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 212 (contending that the
Lord Chancellor should cease to sit as a judge and his responsibility for the system of
judicial appointments should thereupon logically end, and also that the Lord Chancellor's
executive responsibility for the administration of justice should be transferred to a
minister of justice, and arguing that the office of Lord Chancellor should either continue
as an honorary post with the sole role of Speaker of the House or Lords, or it should be
entirely abolished.).
188. Spencer, supra note 187, at 2. See also Drewry, supra note 176, at 502 n. 1, 507
(Joad's Eye View) (noting that the Alliance parties had a detailed proposal for a
Department of Justice in their 1987 Election manifesto).
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Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor when she has urged the American
judiciary to pay greater attention to how the U.S. legal system is viewed
in other countries.
18 9
Many observers of the British legal system in the 1990s expressed
the internal concern that the British legal system was failing to
adequately guarantee impartial justice that was sufficiently independent
from politics. For example, Lord Steyn, one of the Lords of Appeal in
Ordinary in the House of Lords, charged that "[u]nder governments of all
complexions, the Lord Chancellor is always a spokesman for the
government in the furtherance of its party political agenda."' 190 The
activities of Lord Mackay (1987-1997) attracted much criticism. The
Times legal correspondent Frances Gibb has written that Lord Mackay,
although personally "[c]harming, mild-mannered, and courteous...
prompted some of the most bitter hostility-and the worst personal
abuse-directed at a Lord Chancellor this century."' 91
When Lord Mackay introduced Green Papers to reform the English
legal profession and courts, many senior judges criticized him for
allowing his responsibility as a member of the executive to override his
duty to protect judicial independence.' 92  His efforts to cut costs by,
among other things, raising civil court fees and reducing the availability
of legal aid, faced substantial opposition from the senior judiciary. 193
Lord Mackay also received criticism for sitting as a judge in cases in
which the government had an interest. Prominent among these was the
reargument of an appeal to the Appellate Committee of the House of
Lords in Pepper v. Hart.194 One issue in this case was whether reference
to Hansard, the edited verbatim record of debates in both Houses of
Parliament, was a permissible aid for the interpretation of ambiguous
189. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
190. Steyn, supra note 58, at 90-91.
191. Frances Gibb, '[felt what I was doing was right', THE TIMES, May 2, 1997, at
A3.
192. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 98, at 16; RICHARD L. ABEL, ENGLISH
LAWYERS BETWEEN MARKET AND STATE: THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM 39-40
(2003). The controversial Green Papers introduced by Mackay were: THE WORK AND
ORGANIZATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 1989, Cm. 570; CONTINGENCY FEES, 1989,
Cm. 571, and CONVEYANCING BY AUTHORISED PRACTITIONERS, 1989, Cm. 572. Despite
the opposition of many judges and barristers, many of the proposal in these Green Papers
nevertheless became law in the Courts and Legal Services Act of 1990, c. 41 (U.K.),
although some concessions were made to the concerns of the judiciary, including the
requirement that senior judges should have the right to approve the granting of rights of
audience in the higher courts.
193. See WOODHOUSE, supra note 33 at 87-89.
194. Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart [1993] A.C. 593 (involving a tax law issue
over how teachers at independent schools should be taxed when their children were
educated at reduced fees at the schools where they taught; the outcome depended on the
interpretation of the word "cost" in the Finance Act of 1976).
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legislation. The government was strongly opposed to changing the
previous rule excluding recourse to Hansard as an aid to statutory
construction. Lord Mackay was the only Law Lord to disagree with the
leading judgment of Lord Browne-Wilkinson that the traditional rule
should be relaxed in certain limited circumstances, including where
legislation was ambiguous or obscure, or where the literal meaning
would give rise to manifestly absurd and unreasonable consequences. 195
Critics considered Lord Mackay's exercise of his discretion to sit as a
judge in this case to be a conflict of interest that failed to promote
confidence in judicial independence from government pressures.
196
Similar concerns arose from Lord Mackay's failure to withdraw from
giving judgment in two Privy Council cases in which the government
had an interest when he was appointed Lord Chancellor in 1987.197
Lord Irvine also attracted censure for sitting as a judge in particular
cases involving constitutional or political issues. One controversial
appeal that Lord Irvine chose to hear as Lord Chancellor was Director of
Public Prosecutions v. Jones, concerning the highly contentious Public
Order Act 1986 and its effect on the right to peaceful assembly on a
public highway. 98 Many prominent lawyers voiced their concerns about
Lord Irvine's decision to hear this case involving the rights of individuals
against the State, even though he found for the individuals. 199
195. Id. at 634 (judgment of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, accepting that a "limited
modification" should be made to the traditional rule to permit reference to Hansard as an
aid to statutory construction of ambiguous or obscure legislation, or where adherence to
its literal meaning would have an absurd result"), 614-15 (judgment of Lord Mackay,
objecting that these categories were so broad as to permit recourse to Hansard in almost
every case involving an issue of statutory construction, which would raise litigation costs,
though construing the provision (without reference to Hansard) in the teachers' favor).
196. See, e.g., Dawn Oliver, Pepper v. Hart: a suitable case for reference to
Hansard?, PUBLIC LAW 5, 6 (1993).
197. WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 124. These two cases were Rowling v. Takaro
Properties Ltd. [1988] A.C. 473 (P.C.) (involving the issue of whether the Attorney
General and Minister of Finance of New Zealand were liable for negligence when
deciding on an application for consent to issue shares to a foreign investor) and Hone v.
Maze Prison Board of Visitors [1988] 1 A.C. 379 (H.L.) (conceming whether a prisoner
who appeared before a board of visitors on a disciplinary charge had the right to legal
representation at that hearing).
198. See Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jones [1999] 2 A.C. 240 (involving a
peaceful protest to the perimeter fence excluding the public from the Stonehenge
monument in which the defendant protesters stood on the roadside, some holding
banners).
199. See 593 PARL. DEBS., H.L. (5th ser.) (1998), cols. 1971-72 (speech of Lord
Lester of Herne Hill, criticizing Lord Irvine's choice to hear this appeal and noting that
many other prominent lawyers shared his concerns, including Heather Hallett QC, the
chair of the Bar Council of England and Wales; Philip Dry, President of the Law Society
of Scotland; Antoinette Curran, President of the Law Society of Northern Ireland; Roy
Amlot, QC, recent chairman of the Criminal Bar Association; and Michael Lavery, QC,
chairman of the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights in Northern Ireland).
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Additionally there was widespread condemnation of Lord Irvine
over the so-called "cash for wigs affair." This erupted in 2001, after it
became public knowledge that Lord Irvine had sent personal requests to
lawyers who supported the Labour Party, seeking their donations to the
party at a fund-raising dinner at the Atlantic Grill and Restaurant.2 °°
Critics charged that it was highly improper for the Minister responsible
for judicial appointments to solicit money from possible appointees. 20 1
Lord Irvine did not mollify them when he responded by denying any
wrongdoing and refusing to apologize.0 2 In a statement to the House of
Lords (delivered as a Government spokesman, away from the
Woolsack), Lord Irvine described the office of Lord Chancellor as at its
essence a political post, and contended that fundraising was as acceptable
for the Lord Chancellor as for any other government minister.20 3
As criticism mounted over such internal concerns, it also grew with
respect to the external concern that the British constitutional system was
not sufficiently transparent to ensure that justice was publicly
perceivable in a manner appropriate for a modem democratic society.
Such external concern intensified as a result of two significant
constitutional developments, the enactment of major human rights
legislation and devolution, both of which gave significant new powers to
courts.
As of October 2000, the 1998 Human Rights Act made it possible to
enforce many rights in the European Convention on Human Rights
("European Convention") in United Kingdom courts.20 4 Although the
200. See SLAPPER & KELLY, supra note 15, at 198-99; Frances Gibb, The meal that
has cost Derry dear, THE TIMEs, Feb. 27, 2001; see also, e.g., Anthony Scrivener,
Appalling folly and why he must go, DAILY MAIL, Feb. 22, 2001, at 8, Paul Eastham &
Lucie Morris, Labour lawyers join the chorus demanding: Irvine must go, DAILY MAIL,
Feb. 20, 2001, at 4.
201. See Gibb, supra note 200.
202. Parl. Debs., H.L. (5th ser.) (2001), col. 874 (speech of Lord Irvine of Lairg)
(stating "I am simply saying that I do not believe that I have done anything wrong. Nor
do I believe that I have broken any current rules. If I did, I would be the first to
apologise.").
203. Id. (stating "There is no real difference between party-political campaigning and
fundraising because I believe that fundraising is an inherent part of party-political
campaigning. We would be unrealistic not to recognise that. A great deal has been said
about the office of Lord Chancellor being non-party political. That is simply not true. At
the great age of 79, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hailsham, toured the country in the
1987 general election campaign. Lord Kilmuir was even more frequently on the
campaign trail. In 1997, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, took a
high political profile to speak out strongly against Scottish devolution. I take the view
that, unless and until the rules are changed, a Lord Chancellor is no different from any
other Cabinet Minister").
204. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.); Human Rights Act 1998
(Commencement No. 2) Order (2000) SI 2000/1851. The Human Rights Act applies to
all of the thirteen main European Convention rights except Article 13. Id. § l(1)(a). It
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Human Rights Act does not overrule the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty, it requires courts to interpret legislation to give effect, as far
as possible, to European Convention rights, and empowers courts to issue
a declaration of incompatibility if they cannot interpret a legislative
provision consistently With the European Convention.2 °5 Devolution
now requires United Kingdom courts to adjudicate disputes between the
central Executive and the executive authorities in Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland over whether the devolved bodies have acted within the
scope and limits of their devolved powers.20 6
For a Lord Chancellor to hear a human rights or devolution case
would seem to pose clear conflict of interest difficulties, but Lord Irvine
refused to agree to any categorical restrictions on appeals he would
hear.20 7 Lord Irvine's insistence on retaining such broad discretion over
whether to sit in individual cases fueled the external concern that the
British justice system lacked the appearance of fairness, regardless of
whether the Lord Chancellor has in fact fairly and reasonably exercised
his discretion.
Reflecting this external concern about the need for the appearance
of fairness, the European Commission on Human Rights
("Commission") ruled in 2000 in McGonnell v. United Kingdom that the
Bailiff of Guernsey, an official who, like the British Lord Chancellor,
had functions straddling the legislative, executive and judicial branches
of government, had violated the right to a fair trial in Article 6 of the
European Convention by serving as sole professional judge on a dispute
over planning permission.20 8 The Commission accepted that the Bailiff
spent the majority of his time in judicial functions and also that his other
functions did not interfere with his judicial work. But these findings did
not alleviate the Commission's concern about the appearance of
impartiality where the Bailiff was a senior member of all three branches
of government. The Commission stated in its decision that "[i]t is
incompatible with the requisite appearances of independence and
does not include all of the European Convention's Protocols, but only Articles 1-3 of the
First Protocol and Articles 1-2 of the Sixth Protocol, to be read with Articles 16 and 18 of
the European Convention. Id. § 1(1). The reason behind the delay in the Act's coming
into force was the need to train the judiciary. European Convention rights were
incorporated earlier in Scotland, when the Scotland Act of 1998 came into force in July,
1999. Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46, §§ 100-101 (U.K.); Scotland Act 1998
(Commencement) Order (1998) SI 1998/3178.
205. Human Rights Act §§ 3-4.
206. See Government of Wales Act, 1998, c. 38, § 109, Sch.8 (U.K.), Scotland Act, §
98, Sch. 6 (U.K.), Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47, § 79, Sch. 10 (U.K.).
207. See infra note 212, and accompanying text.
208. McGonnell v. United Kingdom (2000) 30 Eur. H.R. Rep. 289 (25 votes to 5).
Article 6 of the Convention guarantees, inter alia, the right to a fair and public hearing in
civil and criminal matters by "an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."
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impartiality for a judge to have legislative and executive functions as
substantial as those [carried out by the Bailiff]. 2 9 The European Court
of Human Rights agreed that the Bailiff did not have "the required
'appearance' of independence, or the required 'objective' impartiality" to
satisfy Article 6(1).210
Neither the Commission nor the European Court of Human Rights
specifically mentioned the British Lord Chancellor in McGonnell, but
their reasoning would seem to apply even more strongly to the Lord
Chancellor than to the Bailiff of Guernsey. Adding to the likelihood that
the Lord Chancellor would fail to satisfy the "appearance of
independence and impartiality" requirement of Article 6 were the facts
that, unlike the Bailiff, the Lord Chancellor's functions were not
primarily judicial, and the Bailiff enjoyed much greater security of tenure
than the Lord Chancellor.211
It is ironic, in light of the implications for his position as Lord
Chancellor, that Lord Irvine was an instrumental player in pushing
through the human rights reforms.212 For that reason, Michael Beloff QC
called Article 6 of the European Convention the "Lord Chancellor's
suicide note., 213 It certainly looked like one in June 2003, when the
Government suddenly announced its intention to abolish the office of
Lord Chancellor.
V. A Flawed Process of Reform: Lack of Transparency and Adequate
Consultation
From the start, the Government's process of reform was marred by
secrecy, a lack of consultation, and excessive haste. Moreover, personal
relationships often trumped policy considerations. The result of this
flawed process was that the Government eventually had to back down on
the abolition of the office of Lord Chancellor, although it did succeed in
enacting legislation that profoundly changed it. But the Government's
209. Id. at 301.
210. Id. at 307-308.
211. See WOODHOUSE, supra note 33, at 129 (noting that the Bailiff, who is appointed
by the Queen and not the Prime Minister, serves at Her Majesty's pleasure until
retirement at age 70).
212. See, e.g., LORD IRVINE OF LAIRG, the Human Rights Bill, House of Lords 2nd
Reading; The Development of Human Rights in Britain under an Incorporated
Convention on Human Rights; Constitutional Change in the United Kingdom: British
Solutions to Universal Problems; Britain 's Programme of Constitutional Change in
HUMAN RIGHTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL
SYSTEM, SELECTED ESSAYS 7-56, 87-102 (2003).
213. Michael Beloff QC, A legal step that had to be taken, THE OBSERVER, June 15,
2003, at 15. See infra note 218 (for more information on the meaning of "QC," the
abbreviation for Queen's Counsel).
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reform process was not in keeping with its underlying goal of ensuring
that the United Kingdom constitutional system promoted external
perceptions of fairness, justice and judicial independence from political
pressures. Even if the end result of the reforms ultimately does increase
the separation of powers (thus addressing internal concerns about actual
fairness, justice, and judicial independence), the means used to achieve
this result are very troubling.
Chance played far too great a role in the process of reform. The
Government's initial proposals for reform of the office of Lord
Chancellor reform put too much power into the executive branch, and
only achieved adequate protection for judicial independence after the
judiciary mobilized themselves to hammer out an agreement, the
concordat, that ensured such protections. The Government should have
provided greater opportunity for pre-legislative and legislative scrutiny
of its proposals so that constitutional protection for judicial independence
was not left so much up to chance. It should have consulted with the
judiciary before announcing such drastic reform proposals. The haste to
push through legislation for reasons of political expediency was not
calculated to give rise to a better constitutional balance than the existing
one. Excessive secrecy and lack of consultation made it very difficult to
achieve consensus on the need for the reforms as a matter of well-
reasoned constitutional principle. Many important issues were never
adequately considered or discussed, such as the messy division of
judicial functions between the Lord Chancellor and Home Secretary and
the impact of the reforms on the constitutional conventions that underpin
the British constitutional system.
A. The Government's Sudden Announcement of Reforms to the Office of
Lord Chancellor
At 5:45 p.m. on June 12, 2003, the Prime Minister's office suddenly
and without prior public warning announced, through a press release, a
Cabinet reshuffle that included the abolition of the Lord Chancellor's
Department.21 4  The press release stated that the Lord Chancellor's
Department would be replaced by a new Department of Constitutional
Affairs, which would be headed by a Secretary of State for Constitutional
Affairs.215 The Government also announced the retirement of the
214. See Press Release, 10 Downing Street, Modemising Government-Lord
Falconer appointed Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs (June 12, 2003) available
at http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3892.asp; see also Kamal Ahmed & Gaby
Hinsliff, Focus: After the Reshuffle-Blair's Botched Revolution, THE OBSERVER, June 15
2003, at 14.
215. Id.
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216incumbent Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg.
This bombshell announcement that Lord Irvine would step down
sent shockwaves through the Government because of his close ties to the
Prime Minister. While practicing as a successful barrister,21 7 Lord Irvine
was the young Tony Blair's pupilmaster,218 and served as an important
mentor to Blair throughout the years that followed.2 19  He even
introduced Blair to his wife, the former Cherie Booth, thereby earning
the nickname "Cupid QC. '220  Lord Irvine also loaned the Blairs the
money to buy their first home in Sedgefield after Tony Blair was elected
Member of Parliament for that constituency.22' It has been reported that
216. Id.
217. Lord Irvine founded a highly respected employment law chambers, 11 King's
Bench Walk. See 11 King's Bench Walk webpage, About Chambers,
http://www. l kbw.com/. See also BBC News Profile, Lord Irvine, BBC NEWS, June 12,
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/politics/2968234.stm.
218. A pupilmaster is a barrister who supervises the period of apprenticeship required
to become a fully qualified barrister. Lord Irvine QC was one of the youngest barristers
ever to "take silk," that is appointed a Queen's Counsel ("QC") by the Queen on the
advice of the Lord Chancellor (so effectively appointed by the Lord Chancellor). QC is
an honorable status awarded to particularly successful senior barristers. See BAILEY,
supra note 4, at 174. QCs wear silk, not stuff, gowns like junior barristers, are permitted
to sit in the front row of the courtroom, and are typically employed to argue larger or
more complex cases, often using a junior barrister or barristers to assist with pleadings
and case preparation. See DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER
08/03, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM: THE FUTURE OF QUEEN'S COUNSEL 5, 8, 10 (July,
2003), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/qcfuture/.
QCs generally charge significantly higher fees than junior barristers. Id. at 13.
Among its many constitutional reforms, the Blair Government initiated reform to the
system for appointment of QCs, suspending it in 2002. See generally id. In May 2004,
the Government announced that the QC title would be retained for a few years pending a
wider review of legal services. The system for appointing QCs was somewhat changed
in the interim. Among other things, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State would no
longer have a role in selecting candidates for QC. See 10 Downing Street Press Release,
New QC scheme to put customer first (May 26, 2004), available at http://www.number-
10.gov.uk/output/Page5864.asp; Lord Falconer of Thoroton, The Future of Queen's
Counsel, Written Ministerial Statement (May, 2004), available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/
judicial/judges/qcstatement.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2005). A new selection process for
QCs was agreed between the Bar Council and the Law Society and approved by the Lord
Chancellor and Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs. See Summary of the Process
for QC Award England and Wales (Nov. 2004), available at
http://www.qcapplications.org.uk/process. The Government set up a new QC selection
panel that accepted applications between July and September 2005. See Application and
Selection for Queen's Counsel website, http://www.qcapplications.org.uk/ (last visited
Sept. 29, 2005).
219. See DOMINIC EGAN, IRVINE-POLITICALLY CORRECT? (1999). See also BBC
News Profile, Lord Irvine, supra note 217.
220. See Nicholas Watt & Claire Dyer, A law unto himself: Derry Irvine's reluctant
refusal of a £22,691 pay rise is just the latest in a series of gaffes that includes his
£30,000 splurge on wallpaper. So how much longer will Tony Blair tolerate his
accident-prone lord chancellor?, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 12, 2003, at 2 (Features).
221. Andrew Pierce, Revealed: debt paid to cupid who brought the Blairs together,
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Lord Irvine was the only person that Blair would permit to call him
"Young Tony.
222
Blair apparently believed that speed and secrecy were required
because of the delicacy involved in sacking his great mentor and
friend.223 Baroness Kennedy has commented that "it must have felt like
an act of patricide. 224  The Prime Minister limited discussion of his
plans to his closest advisers and did not follow the usual procedure of
forming a Cabinet sub-committee to scrutinize the proposed
constitutional changes.22 5 One Blair adviser commented, "How could
you discuss it around the Cabinet table when the person whose job you
were discussing was sitting right there?"
226
That person, Lord Irvine of Lairg, was in fact highly controversial
as Lord Chancellor. He was the subject of widespread criticism by
Labour and Tory politicians alike.227 Many Labour politicians deeply
distrusted Lord Irvine, not only because of his close ties to the Prime
Minister, but because they believed he did not hold key Labour party
values, despite his distinctly humble Glaswegian origins as the son of a
roofer and a waitress. 8 Some critics accused him of arrogance after he
likened himself to Cardinal Wolsey, one of the most powerful Lord
Chancellors and de facto Prime Minister during the reign of Henry
VIII. 229 A Sun journalist who authored a tongue-in-cheek comparison of
Wolsey and Irvine under the heading Pompous Ass v. Pompous Ass,
pointed out a number of similarities between the two Lord Chancellors,
including flamboyance, greed, and arrogant behavior (the latter attribute
said to consist of Lord Irvine's use of an assistant to peel his oranges and
Cardinal Wolsey's clearing of the streets of London to enable him to ride
a mule decked out with gold and velvet trappings).23 ° In response to the
furor over his remarks, Lord Irvine later claimed that he had been
joking.2 31
Tory politicians charged Lord Irvine with extravagance after he
spent over £650,000 of public funds on the interior decoration of the
THE TIMES, July 29, 2004, at 6 (Features).
222. See Ahmed & Hinsliff, supra note 214, at 14.
223. Id.
224. 657 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004), col. 1289 (speech of Baroness Kennedy
of The Shaws).
225. Ahmed & Hinsliff, supra note 214, at 14.
226. Id.
227. For some of Lord Irvine's actions that sparked criticism, see supra notes 198-
203 and accompanying text.
228. See BBC News Profile, Lord Irvine, supra note 217.
229. See David Starkey, A few words of warning to the 'Cardinal'; As Lord Irvine
likens himself to Thomas Wolsey, DAILY MAIL, Dec. 2, 1997, at 8.
230. Tim Spanton, Is Derry Really Another Wolsey?, THE SuN, Feb. 11, 2003, at 18.
231. Starkey, supra note 229, at 8.
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Lord Chancellor's large rent-free "grace and favour" apartment in the
Palace of Westminster, including £59,000 on expensive new
wallpaper.232 Lord Irvine dismissed the storm of criticism over his
redecoration as a "storm in a teacup.2 33 But as the political humorist
Matthew Parris quipped, "£650,000! Some teacup. 234 Similar criticism
erupted after Lord Irvine received a pay increase of more than £22,000,
although part of this was later revoked pending a review of the laws
tying the Lord Chancellor's pay to the senior judiciary and civil
servants.235 And there was a storm of controversy over Lord Irvine's
efforts to modernize the Lord Chancellor's court dress.
236
Notwithstanding the public uproar over Lord Irvine's actions as
Lord Chancellor, the Government's press release announcing his
resignation included some warm words of gratitude from Blair:
Derry Irvine has been a very senior member of the Cabinet for six
years, a man of great integrity, and a most trusted adviser and friend.
Derry's contribution to the Government's programme of devolution
and constitutional reform has been outstanding. I respect his wish to
retire and pay tribute to all he has achieved.
The same press release also announced that the first Secretary of State
for Constitutional Affairs (hereafter "Secretary of State") would be Lord
Charles "Charlie" Falconer of Thoroton, and that Lord Falconer would
232. See David Wighton, Irvine defends £650,000 decoration bill, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 4,
1998, at 1 (noting that each roll of the handmade wallpaper selected by Lord Irvine cost
£300); Ewen Macaskill, Irvine indicates opening hours after £650,000 political refit, THE
GUARDIAN, Mar. 5, 1998, at 11. Lord Irvine defended the expense as for a "noble cause,"
arguing that the refurbishment would benefit the public and improve the national
heritage. See James Landale, Irvine defends his 'noble cause,' THE TIMES, Mar. 4, 1998,
at 12. Lord Irvine also infuriated the nation's wallpaper manufacturers, who were
angered by his claim that he could not have used cheaper wallpaper because it would
"collapse after a year or so." See Peter Foster, Up Against the Wall: Irvine 's taste put to
test, THE TIMES, Mar. 7, 1998, at 3; see also Wallpaper makers hit back at cheap 'insult,'
THE TIMES, Mar. 4, 1998, at 3.
233. Matthew Parris, Being ever so humble, there's no place quite like this home, THE
TIMES, Mar. 4, 1998, at 14.
234. Id.
235. See Rosemary Bennett, Huge pay rise for Blair crony provokes fury, THE TIMES,
Feb. 8 2003, at 1 (Home News) (noting that the government sought to defend the pay
raise, which would increase Irvine's pay to a total of £202,736, on the ground that it was
required by rules stipulating that the Lord Chancellor's salary exceed the Lord Chief
Justice by £2,500). See also Joshua Rozenberg & Andrew Sparrow, Don't worry, Lord
Irvine, your pension still goes up, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 11, 2003, at 10 (noting
that the proposed pay increase was a 12.6 per cent rise on his salary of £180,096). See
also Ben Russell, Brown Denies Forcing Irvine to Turn Down Pounds 22,000 Pay Rise,
THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 20, 2003, at 8 (reporting that Irvine eventually agreed to receive
only a pay rise of 2.25 percent, the same increase received by other Cabinet ministers,
which amounted to slightly over £4,000).
236. See supra notes 128-32.
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simultaneously serve as Lord Chancellor until that office was
abolished.237 Unlike the often socially inept Lord Irvine, who seemed to
be the master of the political gaffe, Lord Falconer, dubbed the "cheery
chappie" by journalists, was socially charming, so much so that as a
young man he successfully enticed away Blair's sixth-form girlfriend,
Amanda Mackenzie Stuart, the first female to attend Fettes College,
Blair's exclusive Edinburgh public school.2 38
But despite his cheery bonhomie, Falconer's appointment sparked
yet more controversy because of his own close ties to the Prime Minister.
Despite their competition over Mackenzie Stuart's affections, Blair and
Falconer became close friends, and shared a house in London as young
239lawyers in their twenties. Until the late 1990s, Falconer had
successfully practiced as a barrister.240  He was appointed Solicitor
General in May of 1997, and later served the Blair Government in a
variety of ministerial positions, including Minister of State at the Cabinet
Office, Minister for Housing, Planning and Regeneration at the
Department of Transport, and Minister of State for Criminal Justice,
Sentencing and Law Reform at the Home Office.241
Despite Falconer's prior legal and government experience, there
was immediate and widespread criticism of his appointment on the
grounds that, like Lord Irvine, he was one of "Tony's cronies," whose
appointment reeked of shameless patronage.242 One Guardian journalist
facetiously imagined the following conversation between a young
237. Press Release, 10 Downing Street, Modernising Government-Lord Falconer
appointed Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs (June 12, 2003) available at
http://www.number- 10.gov.uk/output/Page3892.asp.
238. Quentin Letts, Chuckling Charlie, DAILY MAIL, Feb. 26, 2004, at 19; Edward
Heathcoat Amory, A Man unable to speak to the ordinary people, DAILY MAIL, Sept. 7,
2000, at 7; see also Ian Macwhirter, Couldn't the executive even stick its neck out over
maize?, GLASGOW HERALD, Mar. 10, 2004, at 14. A British "public school" bears more
resemblance to an American private school than an American public school. The Fettes
College website is at: http://www.fettes.com/.
239. Letts, supra note 238.
240. John Mortimer, We have a Cabinet full of lawyers with no idea of justice John
Mortimer says his creation Rumpole would be moved to righteous wrath at Labour's
legal reforms, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 30, 2003, at 20.
241. See Lord Falconer of Thoroton, Biographical details at http://www.dca.gov.uk/
lcframe.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
242. See, e.g., Leader, Cronyism Sours Law Reform, THE EXPRESS, June 19, 2003, at
12. Falconer himself has accused of cronyism with regard to his appointment of his
former pupilmaster and friend Sir Mark Potter, a commercial lawyer with little family
law experience, to head one of the most powerful judicial positions, the president of the
High Court's Family Division. See Clare Dyer, Falconer angers top judges, THE
GUARDIAN, Jan. 12, 2005, at 1 (Home Section), available at
http://politics.guardian.co.uk/lords/story/0,9061,1388436,00.html; Clare Dyer, A family
row: Today the government unveils plans to shake up the family justice system, THE
GUARDIAN, Jan. 18, 2005, at G2.
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Falconer and his housemate Blair:
Wandsworth flat. A grimy kitchen. It is early morning. Two young
barristers are preparing breakfast. Falconer, sweating slightly in his
dressing gown, has his head inside the fridge. Blair, already up and
dressed, scribbles idly on the back of an envelope.
Falconer (indistinctly): Blair, you bastard, you've nicked my bread
again, haven't you?
Blair: I didn't, honest.
Falconer (extracts head and carefully inspects Blair's chin): Blair, I
can see a crumb.
Blair (flourishing his envelope): Look, when I'm prime minister I'll
make you a lord, OK?
Falconer: Bollocks. I'm hungry.
Blair: Look, I can put you in the cabinet! You won't even have to
get elected.
Falconer (grudgingly): What as?
Blair: Anything you like. Defence, Home Office -
Falconer (interrupting): Lord Chancellor, or you find another flat.
Blair: Look (laughs nervously), the thing is, I've already put Derry
down.
Falconer: I want my toast.
Blair: OK Charlie, promise, after Derry. I'll think of something.
Promise.
243
Another commonly voiced criticism of Blair's appointment of
Falconer was that it was profoundly undemocratic because Falconer had
not been elected and was therefore not sufficiently politically
accountable.2 44
243. Catherine Bennett, Exclusive: The Blair-Falconer deal, THE GUARDIAN, June 19,
2003, at 7.
244. Id.
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Undeterred by such criticism, the Government announced that the
new Department of Constitutional Affairs would take on most of the
responsibilities of the former Lord Chancellor's Department, including
the historic role of Keeper of the Great Seal, as well as responsibility for
the administration of justice of English and Welsh courts and tribunals,
legal aid, legal services, civil and family law reform, and constitutional
24514matters.  But the Lord Chancellor would no longer sit as a judge.246
Once the planned new Judicial Appointments Commission was finalized,
the Lord Chancellor would also no longer be responsible for judicial
selection.247  Nor would the Lord Chancellor continue to serve as
Speaker of the House of Lords.248 However, the Secretary of State would
retain the Lord Chancellor's responsibility to safeguard judicial
independence.2 49  The new Secretary of State would have some new
responsibilities, including the supervision of the Scotland and Wales
Offices, which would cease to be independent Ministries and would
move to the new Department for Constitutional Affairs.25°
The announcement did not propose a European-style Ministry of
Justice that would also take over the criminal justice responsibilities of
the Home Office. This was the result of the determined opposition of the
then Home Secretary, David Blunkett.25 1  The Blair Government had
plans to reform the criminal justice system and apparently feared that a
shake-up of the Home Office would jeopardize these plans. But leaving
judicial responsibilities spread across ministries made the reform
proposal far messier and less logical than it needed to be.
After the announcement, the Prime Minister received widespread
criticism for initiating such sweeping constitutional change too quickly
and without an appropriate consultation process.252 The Prime Minister's
245. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra note
4, at 6, 18-21 (noting that some of the Lord Chancellor's responsibilities for children
and families would be transferred to the Secretary of State for Education and Skills).
246. Press Release, 10 Downing Street, Lord Falconer appointed Secretary of State
for Constitutional Affairs (June 12, 2003), available at http://www.number-
l0.gov.uk/output/Page3892.asp; DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION
PAPER 13/03, supra note 4, at 10.
247. Press Release, 10 Downing Street, supra note 246; see also DEP'T FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra note 4, at TT 6, 14.
248. Press Release, 10 Downing Street, supra note 246; DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
AFFAIRS CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra note 4, at 17.
249. DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIR CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra note 4,
at 15.
250. Press Release, 10 Downing Street, supra note 246.
251. Ahmed & Hinsliff, supra note 214, at 14.
252. Id.; Leader, Revolution by reshuffle: Blair sweeps away 1,400 years of tradition,
THE GUARDIAN, June 13, 2003, at 29; Blair's botched revolution is a total shambles,
WESTERN DAILY PRESS, June 18, 2003; Anne McElvoy, Making a proper Charlie of the
law, EVENING STANDARD, Mar. 10, 2004, at 11.
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failure to immediately explain the changes to the House of Commons
angered many Members of Parliament. For example, on June 17, Eric
Forth, the Member of Parliament for Bromley and Chislehurst, called the
announcement "a half-baked afterthought to the most botched and
shambolic reshuffle in living memory," and speculated that the Prime
Minister "cannot explain because he does not know what it means, and
he will not explain because I doubt whether he cares very much,
either." 253 The Prime Minister did not defend his proposals in the House
of Commons until June 18, 2003, when he described them as "essential
acts of constitutional modernization. ', 254  But he could not justify the
haste and secrecy with which the Government had initiated reform other
than to say that there would be future consultation and debate over the
proposals in the future. 55
Senior judges were also deeply troubled that they were not
consulted about the proposals. The Lord Chief Justice Lord Woolf only
learned of the changes minutes before they were announced.2 56  The
Scottish Law Lord Lord Hope recalled "I saw it on the news at Heathrow
on my way home to Edinburgh one evening. Certainly I was not
consulted, none of us [Lords of Appeal] was. 257 Many senior judges did
not view this lack of consultation as justified. Lord Woolf described the
way in which the proposals were announced as "extremely unfortunate"
and warned that: "[t]he flexibility of our constitutional arrangements is
undeniably desirable, but they should not be so malleable that they can
be changed by Prime Ministerial announcement in the course of a
Government reshuffle. 25 8 Lord Woolf also commented that "it must be
a cause for concern that a decision to abolish such a historic office-with
its pivotal role in the administration of justice as head of the judiciary-
can be taken without any consultation with the judiciary., 259 The former
Lord Chancellor Lord Mackay echoed Lord Woolf s concern that there
253. 407 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2003), col. 217 (speech of Eric Forth).
254. Id. at col. 358 (speech of Tony Blair).
255. Id. at col. 362 (speech of Tony Blair).
256. Clare Dyer, Judges line up for battle over reforms: Six of proposed supreme
courts 12 members denounce harmful and costly plan as judiciary airs fears of threat to
independence, THE GUARDIAN, Nov 8 2003, at 10.
257. HOUSE OF COMMONS CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, FIRST REPORT,
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND A SUPREME COURT (COURT OF FINAL APPEAL) [hereafter
HOUSE OF COMMONS CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT], Feb. 10,
2004, HC 48-1, at 14, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm200304/cmselect/cmconst/cmconst.htm [scroll down to different versions of report].
258. Lord Woolf, Shaping the Future, Speech at Exeter University (Oct. 13, 2004),
available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/judicial/speeches/lcj 141004.htm.
259. This statement is quoted in Joshua Rozenberg, Lord Woolfdiscards the sheep's
clothing, Lord Chief Justice launches Mansion House attack over judges being kept in the
dark on abolition of Lord Chancellor, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, July 10 2003, at 19.
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had not been sufficient scrutiny of the reforms, calling them "even less
than half-baked.,
260
To many other observers, the Government's proposals were not
only rushed through with inadequate consultation, but also sloppy and
confused. The Government's announcement of the changes to the Lord
Chancellor's office had to be redrafted at the eleventh hour, because of
the initial failure to realize that the office could not be unilaterally
abolished without legislation.26' One Whitehall official told journalists:
"[i]t was all so rushed and chaotic. 262  Even as redrafted, the
Government's announcement confused many about exactly what
constitutional role Lord Falconer would play as Secretary of State for
Constitutional Affairs. Even some members of Blair's own party
denounced the proposed reforms. One Labour Member of Parliament,
Bob Marshall-Andrews,263 commented acerbically: "Parliament decides
the way we are governed, not the Prime Minister on the back of an
envelope. What we have here is a botch. It totally lacks coherence and
clarity. ,264
The Government made embarrassing mistakes. It made a premature
announcement that the Lord Chancellor would no longer serve as
Speaker of the House of Lords while the House of Lords determined who
should take on the role. The Government had failed to realize that a
standing order dating from 1660 meant that the House of Lords could not
sit unless the Lord Chancellor participated in the procession and sat on
the Woolsack. 265 Lord Chancellors traditionally seek the leave of the
House to be absent from the Woolsack for more than a day, but many
peers were so enraged by the Government's announcement that they
refused Lord Falconer leave of absence by proxy. 266 Lord Falconer had
to hastily and shamefacedly put on the traditional wig and gown and join
the Lord Chancellor's procession, attired in the Lord Chancellor's
traditional "fancy dress," although, following the lead of Lord Irvine,
Falconer eschewed the silk stockings and knee breeches. 2 67
260. Dyer, supra note 256, at 10.
261. Ahmed & Hinsliff, supra note 214, at 14.
262. Id.
263. Bob Marshall-Andrews is the Labour MP for Medway. His official website is at:
http://www.epolitix.com/EN/MPWebsites/Bob+Marshall-Andrews (last visited Sept. 29,
2005).
264. Johnston, supra note 10.
265. See House of Lords Standing Order No. 18, Speaker of the House (June 9, 1660),
available at http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld/ldstords/ldso--
d.htm#18; Joshua Rozenberg & George Jones, Reform Blocked by 1,400 years of
tradition, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 14, 2003, at 8. See also supra notes 115-119 and
accompanying text (for a description of the procession).
266. Id.
267. Id.
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Apparently undeterred by the outpouring of critical reactions to its
proposals, the Government announced in a September 2003 consultation
paper that there would be a shorter than usual consultation period for the
implementation of its proposal to abolish the Lord Chancellor.268 It gave
four primary reasons for this decision. First, consultation was not sought
on the "broad principles of the change" but only on "some relatively
narrow issues" relating to certain miscellaneous functions of the Lord
Chancellor, including his ecclesiastical patronage functions and visitorial
jurisdiction.269 Second, there would be separate consultation with certain
affected groups. 270 Third, the consultation papers for the Government's
proposals for a judicial appointments commission and a new Supreme
Court had already been issued with a response date set, and the
Government viewed it as desirable to use the same date since the
abolition of the Lord Chancellor was part of the same broad program of
constitutional reform. 271 Finally, the Government sought to complete the
abolition of the Lord Chancellor's office within eighteen months
(probably due to plans for a general election, although this reason was
not given in its September 2003 consultation paper), and it contended
that a shorter consultation period was necessary to achieve this timing
goal. 272
The litany of problems with the Government's announcement of the
proposed abolition of the Lord Chancellor led the journalist and cross-
bencher2 73 William Rees-Mogg, a life peer, to publicly conclude that the
Prime Minister was a disastrous constitutional reformer:
The Prime Minister is trying to build his historic reputation as a
constitutional reformer, as the great Burke of his generation. It is a
pity he has chosen this area to demonstrate his expertise since neither
he nor his Lord Chancellor seem able to tell the difference between
the British constitution and a turniphead with a candle inside it.
274
In February 2004, a cross-party House of Commons committee on
constitutional affairs agreed with critics of the reforms that the reforms
had been rushed, that the timetable for the constitutional reform
268. See DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra
note 4, at Introduction.
269. Id. See also supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text.
270. See DEP'T FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, CONSULTATION PAPER 13/03, supra
note 4, at Introduction.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. A cross-bencher is a member of the House of Lords who is not aligned with any
party. They do not sit on either the government or the opposition benches, but on
benches perpendicular to both that face the throne.
274. William Rees-Mogg, Blair is trying, and failing, to be a bit of a Burke, THE
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2003, at 18.
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
legislation was too short, and that there had not been a sufficient
consultation period.2 75 It concluded that the reason for the haste had
been political expediency and advised that there should be a revised
timetable to ensure that the proposed constitutional reform legislation
could be properly scrutinized.276
B. Judicial Concerns Lead to the Negotiation of the Concordat
Excessive speed and secrecy were not the only concerns about the
proposed reforms. The judiciary was extremely worried about the
impact of the abolition of the Lord Chancellor on judicial independence.
Representing judges at all levels and acting as the collective voice of the
judiciary as a whole, the Judges' Council submitted a response to the
Government's consultation papers in November 2003.277 This document
warned that replacing the Lord Chancellor with a "primarily political"
Secretary of State seriously threatened judicial independence because the
Secretary of State would "no longer be constrained by judicial
responsibilities and constitutional conventions., 278 The Judges' Council
recommended greater public discussion of the reform proposals, and also
urged the Secretary of State to enter into some formal understanding with
the judiciary to protect judicial independence. 279 The Council listed four
steps as essential for preserving judicial independence: (1) that there be
legislation providing that the Lord Chief Justice take on the role as head
of the judiciary, since a Secretary of State cannot have that role; (2) that
the judiciary should have control over arrangements for deploying judges
and hearing cases; (3) that sufficient funding should be provided for the
effective functioning of the judiciary and the courts; and (4) the judiciary
should continue to have responsibility for training judges and should thus
continue to run the Judicial Studies Board, a body set up in 1979 for the
training of judges by judges.280  Additionally, the Judges' Council
275. HOUSE OF COMMONS CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra
note 257, at 14, 193. See also Robert Verkaik, Complex Judiciary Reforms Rushed
Through, Say MPs, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 10, 2004, at 14.
276. HOUSE OF COMMONS CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT, supra
note 257, at 193.
277. See Judges' Council Response to the Consultation Papers on Constitutional
Reform, Nov. 2003, available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/judicial/pdfs/jcresp.pdf (last
visited Sept. 29, 2005). The Judges' Council is a body representing the interests of the
judiciary at all levels, chaired by the Lord Chief Justice.
278. Id. at 5-6, 27-36.
279. Id. at 7.
280. Id. at 8, 49-63. See also Judicial Studies Board ("JSB") website, About Us,
Introduction, http://www.jsboard.co.uk/aboutus/introduction.htm (stating that "An
essential element of the philosophy of the JSB is that the training of judges and
magistrates is under judicial control and directions. The Judicial Studies Board was set
up in 1979, following the Bridge Report which identified the most important objective of
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expressed the view that any new arrangements for judicial appointments
should "reflect the need to preserve judicial independence and calibre,
and to uphold dignity."28' It also recommended limits on the executive's
role in judicial discipline.282
In an effort to achieve these recommendations, Lord Woolf,
representing the judiciary with the authority of the Judges' Council,
worked with the Lord Chancellor to draft a written agreement on judicial
283independence. In January 2004, they were able to reach agreement on
a document, dubbed the "concordat," and place it before Parliament.284
This was because, as Lord Falconer noted when announcing this
agreement on January 26, 2004, final implementation of the concordat's
proposals required Parliamentary approval.285
Lord Woolf postponed his retirement to negotiate the concordat, but
he clearly viewed this sacrifice as worthwhile.286 He largely succeeded
in obtaining the protections for judicial independence in the concordat
that had been sought by the Judges' Council. The concordat provides,
inter alia, for the imposition of a general statutory duty to respect
judicial independence on the government and those involved in the
administration of justice and judicial appointments, as well as for a
specific statutory duty on the Secretary of State to "defend and uphold
the continuing independence of the judiciary., 287 It also expressly states
that the Secretary of State will not sit as a judge, nor will have any role in
judicial decision-making in particular cases. 288 The concordat seeks to
promote transparency through statutory recognition for the role of the
Lord Chief Justice as head of the judiciary, 289 as well as for the duties
judicial training as being "To convey in a condensed form the lessons, which experienced
judges, have acquired from their experience .. " This remains the essence of the JSB's
role.") (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
281. Id.at 9.
282. Id. at 13.
283. Woolf, supra note 258 (Exeter University Speech).
284. Id. See also Dep't for Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Reform, The Lord
Chancellor's judiciary-related functions: Proposals [hereafter "Concordat"] (Jan. 2004),
available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/lcoffice/judiciary.htm#part2 (last visited
Sept. 20, 2005).
285. 657 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004), col. 1231 (speech of Lord Falconer of
Thoroton).
286. Woolf, supra note 258 (Exeter University speech). At time of writing, Lord
Woolf has now retired as Lord Chief Justice, though, surprising many, he returned to the
practice of law as a barrister at the age of 72 See Frances Gibb, Lord Woolfcourts new
clients in a third career, THE TIMES, Oct. 4, 2005, at 25 (reporting this as an
unprecedented career decision for a retired Lord Chief Justice).
287. Concordat, supra note 284, at TT 6-7. The concordat includes the principle that
"the new arrangements should reinforce the independence of the judiciary." Id. at T 5.
288. Id. at 4(b), 8.
289. Under the concordat, the Lord Chief Justice has the responsibility to promote the
well-being of the judiciary by ensuring that there is appropriate training and guidance for
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
and responsibilities of the Secretary of State and senior judiciary after
implementation of the constitutional reforms.
290
Under the concordat, responsibility for judicial administration,
appointments, and discipline is divided between the executive and the
judiciary in an effort to ensure appropriate executive involvement while
simultaneously ensuring judicial independence. 291  As the Judges'
Council had wanted, the concordat makes clear that the deployment of
individual judges is the responsibility of the Lord Chief Justice (although
subject to a requirement of consultation with the Secretary of State), and
the allocation of individual cases to particular courts and judges is also
within the control of the judiciary.292 Also in keeping with the wishes of
the Judges' Council, the judiciary is to be in control of judicial training,
subject to the requirement that this be done within the resources allocated
by the Secretary of State.293 The Secretary of State has the duty "to
"ensure that there is an efficient and effective system to support the
carrying on of the business of the courts in England and Wales" and "that
appropriate services are provided for those courts., 294 Additionally, the
judges, that there is an appropriate framework for judicial deployment and work
allocation, and that the views of the judiciary are effectively represented to Parliament,
the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, and the Government. Id. at 4(c). The
Lord Chief Justice is also to have the role of swearing in new judges. Id. at 16. The
concordat provides that the Lord Chief Justice should take his own oath before the Master
of the Rolls. Id. at 18.
290. Id. at 7 3, 10-15 (providing for the Lord Chief Justice to assume the title of
"President of the Courts of England and Wales" (presiding over the Court of Appeal, the
High Court, the Crown Court, the county courts and the magistrates' courts), as well as
for the creation of the following titles: (1) "President of the Queen's Bench Division";
(2) "Head of Criminal Justice" (a position which is to be held ex officio by the Lord Chief
Justice, or, after consultation with the Secretary of State, his nominee); (3) "Head of
Family Justice" (a position to be held ex officio by the President of the Family Division);
(4) "Deputy Head of Family Justice" (a position to be filled at the option of the Lord
Chief Justice) and (5) "Deputy Head of Criminal Justice" (also to be filled at the option
of the Lord Chief Justice). The existing title "Head of Civil Justice" is to be held by the
Master of the Rolls ex officio and the existing title "Vice-Chancellor of the Supreme
Court" will be replaced with a new title of "Chancellor of the Chancery Division"; the
officeholder will have recognition as the president of the Chancery Division.).
291. Id. at 19et seq.
292. See id. at 31, 36. The Lord Chief Justice also has responsibility, subject to
consultation with the Secretary of State, for determining which level of judge can hear
which class of case and criteria for authorizing individual judges to hear certain classes of
case. Id. at TT 37-38. Where deployment issues will have a significant effect on
resources, there is a requirement for the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Id. at T 42.
293. Id. at 66. The Judicial Studies Board will continue to provide judicial training,
though some training of magistrates will be locally managed, and tribunal training may
continue under existing statutory arrangements. Id. at 67, 70-71. Provision is made
for ex officio representation of the Secretary of State on the Judicial Studies Board. Id. at
69. The existing Memorandum of Understanding is to be revised as appropriate subject
to the agreement of the Secretary of State and Lord Chief Justice. Id. at 72.
294. Id. at T 19. Under the concordat, the Secretary of State's responsibilities include
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Secretary of State is charged with providing and allocating financial,
material and human resources to achieve this goal, and is accountable to
Parliament for decisions relating to the provision and allocation of these
resources. 295 The concordat provides for a new Unified Courts Agency
in the Department of Constitutional Affairs.296 The judiciary is to have a
significant role in strategic and resource planning for this new agency,
which, in part, will be achieved through the requirement that a senior
judge sit on the agency's Board as a non-executive member.2 97 The
concordat provides for many other aspects of judicial administration to
be in the control of the executive, subject to a responsibility to consult
with the Lord Chief Justice. These include the total number of judges
and the jurisdiction of particular courts.298 The allowance, disallowance,
and changing of court procedural rules are the responsibility of the
Secretary of State, but the actual rulemaking is the responsibility of
"rule-making" committees, if such exist, and where they do not, of the
Lord Chief Justice.2 99
The concordat imposes responsibility on the Secretary of State to
support the judiciary in the fulfillment of judicial functions. ° ° It makes
judicial discipline subject to a joint protocol to be worked out between
the Secretary of State and Lord Chief Justice and laid before
establishing a framework for the organization of the court system, including the
determination of jurisdictional boundaries, the total number of judges at each level of
courts, the geographical location of courts, the administrative staffing of courts, the
distribution of court business between different levels of courts (e.g. High Court and
County Court), and the sitting times for courts, but do not extend to the deployment of
individual judges or the distribution of business within the same level of courts, which
are the responsibility of the Lord Chief Justice. Id. at 26-27, 29-33. These duties of
the Secretary of State duties are generally subject to a duty to consult the Lord Chief
Justice, and vice versa. Id at 7 26, 28, 29-33.
295. Id. at 4, 19. These resources include judicial pay and pensions, conditions of
employment, necessary staff and resources for the Lord Chief Justice. Id. at 77 21-22.
296. Id. at 20.
297. Id. at 20, 24-25.
298. See id. at 7 29 et seq., 32 et seq.
299. Id. at 50, 51-52 53, 56. The Secretary of State must provide written reasons
for the decision to disallow rules. Id. at 52. Before rules for tribunals are considered in
a White Paper, the Secretary of State has responsibility for rule-making for those
tribunals where the Lord Chancellor previously had this responsibility. Id. at 57. There
is shared responsibility for the appointment of members of rule-making committees: the
Secretary of State has the power to appoint non-judicial members, in consultation with
the Lord Chief Justice, while the Lord Chief Justice has the power to appoint judicial
members, in consultation with the Secretary of State. Id. at 58. The Lord Chief Justice
has the power to make Practice Directions for criminal, civil, and family courts, with the
concurrence of the Secretary of State. Id. at 63. No such concurrence is required for
practice directions concerning guidance on the law and the making of judicial decisions.
Id. at 65.
300. Id. at 4(a).
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Parliament.3 °1  It also provides for most judicial appointments to be
handled by an independent Judicial Appointments Commission with a
substantial proportion of lay members and a chairman that will
recommend appointments to the Secretary of State.3°2 Appointments to
the senior judiciary (Court of Appeal judges and Heads of Division) will
be handled by a special senior appointments panel of the Judicial
Appointments Commission, which must have a substantial proportion of
lay members.30 3  The concordat gives the executive a limited role in
judicial appointments: the Secretary of State can ask that a
recommendation be reconsidered, ask for another nomination, or require
the competition to be rerun, subject to a duty to give reasons for a
rejection or a request for reconsideration.30 4 It requires the Judicial
Appointments Committee to consult the Lord Chief Justice before
301. Id. at 73, 78. The Secretary of State will bear the responsibility of providing
resources for an "effective and efficient" complaints secretariat to initially handle
complaints about judges, though investigations of substantiated or doubtful complaints
will be referred to a judge for advice and the final decision to take disciplinary action will
must be made jointly by the Secretary of State and Lord Chief Justice, who can also
decide that there should be a judicial investigation. Id. at 79, 88-89, 91. The finding
of the Investigating Judge can be accepted by the Lord Chief Justice and the Secretary of
State, or the complaint.may be forwarded to a Review Body, normally consisting of two
judges and two lay members appointed by the Lord Chief Justice and the Secretary of
State, for reconsideration. Id. at 93, 99. Judges of the High Court and higher courts
cannot be removed except by the Queen and an address of both Houses of Parliament. Id.
at 74. Removal of other judges, as well as suspension from sitting pending an
investigation's outcome will require agreement by both the Lord Chief Justice and
Secretary of State. Id. at 75, 76. The Lord Chief Justice will be responsible for
administering other sanctions, such as reprimands, subject to the agreement of the
Secretary of State and consultation with the relevant Head of Division. Id. at 76, 81-
82, 89-90. The power to suspend, reprimand, warn or advise magistrates or tribunal
members can be delegated to other judges or Tribunal presidents. Id. at 77. Complaints
about magistrates will be investigated by local Advisory Committees but can be referred
to the complaints secretariat. Id. at 103-104. Either the Lord Chief Justice or the
Secretary of State can decide, provided each consults the other, that there is a need for a
judicial investigation of a complaint about a magistrate, and the magistrate can ask for the
case to be considered by a Review Body. Id. at 105-106. Complaints about how
complaints about the judiciary or magistrates have been handled can be made to an
ombudsman. Id. at 100-102, 107. These disciplinary procedures are not applicable
where a judge has been convicted of certain serious criminal offenses. Id. at 109.
302. Id. at 44, 114-131 (proposals covering appointment of (1) lay magistrates and
General Commissioners of Income Tax (after an interim period to be determined by the
Judicial Appointments Commission); (2) other judges up to and including the seniority of
High Court judges; (3) Court of Appeal judges; (4) Heads of Division). Filling certain
judicial leadership posts, such as Presiding Judges, is the responsibility of the Lord Chief
Justice, with a requirement either of consultation with or the concurrence of the Secretary
of State. Id. at 43-45. The Secretary of State is responsible for setting out the level
and type of judges required for bodies like committees and boards, while the Lord Chief
Justice has responsibility for appointing individual judges to such bodies. Id. at 46-49.
303. Id. at 121(b)-(c), 122-123.
304. Id. at 116, 120-121.
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recommending a particular candidate for a judicial appointment up to and
including the High Court to the Secretary of State.30 5
The concordat was a major milestone for the proposed reform of the
Lord Chancellor's office because it defused much of the judiciary's
opposition based on concerns that judicial independence would be
threatened. But controversy remained over whether there should still be
a Minister with the title of Lord Chancellor, and if so, whether he should
still be a member and Speaker of the House of Lords, as well as whether
he should be required to be a senior lawyer.
30 6
C. The Struggle to Enact Constitutional Reform Legislation
Even after the negotiation of the concordat, the Government's
efforts to enact constitutional reform legislation faced strong opposition
throughout the legislative process. Much of this opposition was based on
concerns that the reform process was overly rushed and insufficiently
transparent. Although, to the surprise of many observers, this sustained
opposition to the legislation did not kill it, it did force the Government to
back down on its initial proposal to abolish the office of Lord
Chancellor.
On February 24, 2004, the Government introduced a Constitutional
Reform Bill into the House of Lords that included the Government's
proposal to abolish the office of Lord Chancellor, as well as the
proposals to establish a new Supreme Court in place of the House of
Lords and to set up a new Judicial Appointments Commission.30 7 By
introducing this legislation, the Government ignored calls for additional
pre-legislative scrutiny. On February 10, the House of Commons
Constitutional Affairs Committee had issued a report opining that the
Constitutional Reform Bill was "a clear candidate for examination in
draft. 30 8  Two days later, many members of the House of Lords
305. Id. at 119(g).
306. There was also still considerable controversy over the proposed Supreme Court,
but this article does not focus on that proposed reform.
307. Press Release, Department of Constitutional Affairs, Falconer Heads New
Constitutional Era, (Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://www.gnn.gov.uk/environment/
detail.asp?ReleaselD=109496&NewsArealD=2&NavigatedFromDepartment=-True; see
also Constitutional Reform Bill (H.L.), available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld2003O4/ldbills/030/2004030.htm, at cl. 12
(providing that the offices of Lord High Chancellor and Lord Keeper of the Great Seal of
the United Kingdom are to be abolished) and Dep't for Constitutional Affairs,
Explanatory Notes to the Constitutional Reform Bill [hereinafter Explanatory Notes],
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldbills/030/en/04030x-
.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
308. See HOUSE OF COMMONS CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE FIRST REPORT,
supra note 257, at 188 (also recommending that the abolition of the office of Lord
Chancellor should be postponed until the other reforms (establishment of the Judicial
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expressed similar views in debate. 30 9 For example, Lord Alexander of
Weedon stated that "there ought to be pre-legislative scrutiny of any
draft Bill. 310 In the same debate, the Earl of Onslow railed against the
manner in which the government had initiated the reforms.
My Lords... I remember getting angry when it was suddenly
announced on television that the Lord Chancellorship was going to be
abolished. I moved the adjournment of the House because I thought
it was the most ill-mannered, cack-handed way to behave. I do not
resile for one tiny moment from that opinion.
There is a song by Rolf Harris about two little boys, who had two
little toys. I imagine the two little boys, the noble and learned Lord
the Lord Chancellor and the Prime Minister, jumping about in their
flat thinking, "Yippee! What shall we do? Shall we ruin the
constitution? Oh yes, let's abolish ourselves." What an incredibly
irresponsible method of looking at constitutional affairs. So, they
came down to this House, under pressure, and made a Statement,
having already made up their minds without having put any thought
into it. It was admitted that nobody was consulted. It was admitted it
was done off the back of an envelope. The Prime Minister admitted
it was done incompetently. So why should we not say that this is an
incredibly bad idea and please think again?31
1
1. The Constitutional Reform Bill
As introduced, the Constitutional Reform Bill did not just replace
the Lord Chancellor with a Secretary of Statute for Constitutional
Affairs. It also transferred away many of the Lord Chancellor's
traditional functions, although some did remain with the Secretary of
State, including functions relating to custody of the Great Seal.312 The
bill also provided that the statutory powers exercisable by the Lord
Chancellor in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Lords were to be
amended to refer to the Speaker without reference to the Lord
Chancellor, thus leaving it to the House of Lords to work out its own
Appointments Committee and the new Supreme Court) were established. Id. at 191).
309. 657 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004), cols. 1219-1220 (speech of Lord
Kingsland), 1231 (speech of Lord Alexander of Weedon), 1270 (speech of Lord Norton
of Louth), 1286-88 (Lord Mayhew of Twysden), 1306 (speech of Lord Donaldson of
Lymington).
310. Id. at col. 1231 (speech of Lord Alexander of Weedon).
311. Id. at col. 1257 (speech of Lord Onslow).
312. Constitutional Reform Bill (H.L.), supra note 307, at cl. 9, 10, sched. 5 (also
providing that these responsibilities cannot be transferred to any other office of state
without primary legislation, thus negating the power to transfer by secondary legislation).
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arrangements for the Speaker.313 Under the bill, some of the Lord
Chancellor's existing statutory functions relating to the judiciary were
transferred to the Lord Chief Justice or other senior judges, although
some of these functions were to be carried out by the Secretary of
State.3 14
The division of these judicial functions reflected the sharing of
functions between the Secretary of State and the Lord Chief Justice set
out in the concordat. Those functions that related to the organization of
the court system, including determining geographical and jurisdictional
boundaries, the provision of financial, material, and human resources for
judicial administration, judicial pay and pensions, the provision of staff
and resources for judicial training, and the total number of judges and the
distribution of business between different levels of courts, were to be
transferred to the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs.315
Functions relating to the deployment of individual judges, including
making rules relating to the deployment of magistrates, the distribution
of business within the same level of the court system (such as between
divisions of the High Court), the posting and roles of individual judges
within the framework of the court system, and filling judicial leadership
posts and nominating judges to deal with specific areas of business,
would be transferred to the Lord Chief Justice.3 16 As provided by the
concordat, the Secretary of State would take over the Lord Chancellor's
existing statutory functions that gave him the power to determine the
framework for appointing judges to bodies such as committees and
boards, while the Lord Chief Justice would take over those statutory
functions that had previously given the Lord Chancellor the power to
appoint individual judges to such bodies.317 Judicial oaths would no
313. Id. at cl. 11, sched. 6.
314. Id. at cl. 3, sched. I (transferring various judiciary-related functions that were set
out in primary legislation). In certain cases, the bill required the Secretary of State for
Constitutional Affairs to consult the Lord Chief Justice, or vice versa, before exercising a
transferred function. The bill also created new statutory posts of the Head of Criminal
Justice and Head of Family Justice, as set out in the concordat, and also provided that the
Lord Chief Justice could appoint a Deputy Head of Criminal Justice and a Deputy Head
of Family Justice. See id. at cl. 4-5. These posts were created as the counterparts of the
fairly new positions of Head and Deputy Head of Civil Justice, which had been created
by the Courts Act 2003. See Explanatory Notes, supra note 307. Statutes referring to the
Vice-Chancellor would be amended to reflect the new title of the "Chancellor of the High
Court." Constitutional Reform Bill, supra note 307, at sched. 1. The bill also provided
for statutory amendments to provide that the Master of the Rolls would be the ex officio
Head of Civil Justice and for the creation of a new position, President of the Queen's
Bench Division. Id.
315. Constitutional Reform Bill (H.L.), supra note 307, at sched. 1, supra notes 292-
97 and accompanying text.
316. Id. at sched. 1, supra notes 296, 298 and accompanying text.
317. Id. at sched. 1, supra note 302.
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longer be taken before the Lord Chancellor, but instead before the Lord
Chief Justice.318
The Constitutional Reform Bill also provided for significant
changes to the judicial appointments process. While providing that the
Lord Chancellor's judicial appointments functions would be transferred
to the Queen or to the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, it also
required that certain judicial appointments had to be made based on
selection by a Judicial Appointments Commission with a substantial
proportion of lay members. 319 The bill gave the executive only a limited
role in judicial appointments: the Secretary of State could ask that a
recommendation be reconsidered, ask for another nomination, or require
the competition to be re-run, subject to a duty to give reasons for a
rejection or a request for reconsideration.32 °
The bill also made changes to the system of judicial discipline, by
providing for the responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor to be shared
between the Lord Chief Justice and the Secretary of State for
Constitutional Affairs, subject to regulations setting out "prescribed
procedures" to be made by the Lord Chief Justice with the agreement of
the Secretary of State.321 The Lord Chief Justice was given the power to
advise, warn, and formally reprimand judges, subject to the prescribed
procedures and the agreement of the Secretary of State.3 2
The Constitutional Reform Bill also provided for a new statutory
title, "President of the Courts of England and Wales," to be conferred on
the Lord Chief Justice.323 In this role, the Lord Chief Justice had
responsibility for representing the views of the judiciary to Parliament
and government ministers, as well as for providing for judicial
deployment and training (within the resources provided by the Secretary
of State).324
The bill also made provision for the shared exercise of the power to
make rules and practice directions in a similar manner to the concordat.
It provided that procedural rules would continue to be made by existing
rule-making committees, and that the Secretary of State would have the
318. Id. at sched. 1. The Lord Chief Justice would take his oath before the Master of
the Rolls. Id.
319. Id. at cl. 8, sched. 4 (amending various statutes to provide that the Queen was to
appoint district judges, High Court masters and registrars, senior district judges (chief
magistrates) and that the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs was to appoint
certain offices, including various tribunal members, arbitrators, commissioners, circuit
judges, and recorders), cl. 49-72, sched. 10.
320. Id. at cl. 57, 63, 69.
321. Id. atcl. 83.
322. Id. at cl. 83-86.
323. Id. at cl. 2.
324. Id. at cl. 2(2), Explanatory Notes, supra note 307, at 18.
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power to allow rules, to require rules to be changed, and to disallow
rules, so long as he gave written reasons.325 Where such committees did
not exist, the Lord Chief Justice was to exercise rule-making power,
subject to the agreement of the Secretary of State, who was required to
give written reasons for his decision to disallow a rule.326 The bill's
procedure for appointing members to rule-making committees reflected
the Concordat's division of functions between the Lord Chief Justice and
Secretary of State: the Lord Chief Justice was to appoint judicial
members of rule-making committees, and the Secretary of State was to
appoint non-judicial members of such committees. 327 The Lord Chief
Justice was to make practice directions for criminal, civil, and family
courts with the agreement of the Secretary of State.328
The bill incorporated the new legislative safeguards for judicial
independence set out in the concordat. It imposed a general statutory
duty on ministers and all others involved in the administration of justice
to uphold the "continued independence of the judiciary. 329  It also
provided for two particular statutory duties that slightly expanded and
clarified the provisions of the concordat. 330 First, ministers of the crown
were required to refrain from trying to influence judicial decisions
through special access to the judiciary.33' Second, the Secretary of State
must have regard for the need to defend the continued independence of
the judiciary, the need for the judiciary to have proper support to enable
them to exercise their functions, and the need for the public interest in
"matters relating to the judiciary or otherwise to the administration of
justice to be properly represented in decisions affecting those matters.' 332
2. Setbacks for the Government in the Legislative Process
The Constitutional Reform Bill faced sustained opposition
throughout the legislative process, much of it founded on concerns about
haste and lack of consultation in the reform process. Faced with such
sustained opposition to its plans to abolish the Lord Chancellors Office,
325. Constitutional Reform Bill (H.L.), supra note 307, at sched. 1; see also
Explanatory Notes, supra note 307, at 20.
326. Constitutional Reform Bill, supra note 307, at cl. 6 sch. 2, pt. 2.
327. Id. at sched. 1.
328. Id. at sched. 3, pt. 1, cl. 2. According to the Explanatory Notes, "the expectation
is that the power would usually be delegated to the Heads of Criminal, Civil, and Family
Justice." Explanatory Notes, supra note 307, at 26. The Secretary of State's agreement
was not required for practice directions relating to guidance on the law or the making of
judicial decisions. Id.
329. Constitutional Reform Bill, supra note 307, at cl. 1, subsec. 1.
330. Id. at pt. 1, cl. 1(2)-(4); Explanatory Notes, supra note 307, at 17.
331. Constitutional Reform Bill, supra note 307, at cl. 1, subsec. 3.
332. Id. at pt. 1, cl. 1 subsec. 4.
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the Government was forced to compromise.
a. The First Setback: The Bill is sent to a House of Lords Select
Committee that fails to reach agreement on many key aspects of its proposals
The Government suffered its first significant setback to its
legislative efforts on March 8, 2004, when the House of Lords voted to
delay the Constitutional Reform Bill by sending it to the Constitutional
Reform Select Committee ("Select Committee") for review and a
determination on whether the legislation should proceed with or without
amendments.333 The Select Committee could not reach agreement on
many key aspects of the proposals to abolish the office of Lord
Chancellor, including whether wholesale abolition was necessary, as well
as whether the Lord Chancellor/Secretary of State for Constitutional
Affairs should continue to be a senior lawyer and member of the House
of Lords.
Referring a Government bill to a Select Committee is a very
unusual procedure for Government bills, although it is not as rare for
controversial private members' bills, like the Hare Coursing Bill.
334
Normally, Government bills are committed to a Committee of the Whole
House. When bills are referred to a Select Committee, they usually
suffer a fate similar to that of the Hare Coursing Bill, which was killed in
Select Committee in 1975. 335  The last time a Select Committee had
referred a bill to the whole House with amendments was in 1917.336
After taking oral and written evidence, and meeting twice weekly
over a three month period between March and June of 2004, the Select
Committee submitted its required Final Report to the House of Lords on
June 24, 2004. 337 Surprising many, in light of the fate of most bills in
Select Committees, the Final Report's conclusion was that the Bill could
proceed to a Committee of the Whole House for further passage through
333. See HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM BILL
FIRST REPORT, supra note 257, at 5.
334. Id. at 4.
335. Id. at 4 n. 3.
336. See 663 PARE. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.)(2004), col. 1138 (speech of Lord Richard,
Chairman of the Lords Select Committee on the Constitutional Reform Bill).
337. HOUSE OF LORDS SELECT COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM BILL FIRST
REPORT supra note 257, at 6, Appendix 4 (list of witnesses); see also 663 PARL. DEB.,
H.L. (5th ser.) (July 13, 2004), col. 1138) (speech of Lord Richard, noting that "we met in
public to take oral evidence from more than 32 witnesses. We received over 80 written
submissions. We considered the views of 14 serving judges, seven retired judges,14
academics, the lawyers' professional bodies in England and Wales, Scotland and
Northern Ireland, as well as campaign groups, individual lawyers and law firms, and
members of the public. The evidence is published in Volume 2 of the report.").
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Parliament.338 But the Final Report required over 400 amendments to be
made to the bill.339  Many of these were made so that the bill would
better comport with the concordat, which the Select Committee agreed
should be enacted into legislation. 340 But the Select Committee could not
reach agreement on the merits of some key aspects of the Government's
constitutional reform proposals. Although the Select Committee was
able to agree that it endorsed the concordat,34' that the constitutional
reform legislation should fulfill the terms of the concordat (though
declining to give that document "quasi-statutory" status), 342 that the Lord
Chancellor would no longer sit as a judge and serve as head of the
judiciary,343 and that the bill should contain reference to the duty on
Ministers to uphold the rule of law,34 it could not reach agreement on
two major issues: (i) whether there should still be a minister with the
title of Lord Chancellor,345 and (ii) whether there should be a Supreme
Court.
3 4 6
338. Id. at 7.
339. Id. at 6, 9.
340. Id. at 9. Some Select Committee witnesses criticized the introduced legislation
for not fully implementing the concordat. For example, a working party of the Judges'
Council, led by Lady Justice Arden, listed a number of subtle ways in which the wording
and contents of the bill was not consistent with the concordat, including several matters
of judicial deployment, judicial appointments, and judicial discipline. Id. at vol. II, Oral
Evidence, Memorandum by the Judges Working Party on the Bill, Appendix (April,
2004). Lord Woolf also criticized the bill for failing to accurately reflect the concordat.
According to him, even though the bill correctly recognized that judicial deployment was
the responsibility of the judiciary, not the executive, it failed to specify that judicial
deployment also included the appointment of judges to boards, committees and other
similar bodies Id. at vol. II Annex B, Supplementary memorandum of Lord Woolf (June
7, 2004). The Government accepted that the bill failed to fully implement the concordat
in some respects, and proposed a number of amendments to ensure that it did. See id. at
vol. II, Memorandum by the Lord Chancellor, sec. II, Concordat Amendments (May,
2004).
341. Id. at 84. Both proponents and opponents of abolition of the office of Lord
Chancellor supported legislating the principles of the Concordat. Id. at 31.
342. Id. at 85.
343. These were uncontested by both proponents and opponents of abolition. Id. at
9 29-34.
344. Id. at 73. The Committee could not agree on the form of words such a clause
should take. Id. at 9 75.
345. Id. at 44. The Select Committee was "more or less evenly divided" on this
issue. Id. at T 7.
346. Id. at 132. The Select Committee was able to agree on many secondary issues
relating to the Supreme Court, including the court's name, the number of justices and
their qualifications for appointment, the composition of the Selection Commission, the
role of the Prime Minister in the appointment of Supreme Court justices, provisions for
acting justices, that the Supreme Court should continue to be designated a superior court
of record, that the bill's provisions regarding Scottish civil and criminal appeals should
not be changed; that devolution jurisdiction should be transferred from the Privy Council
to the Supreme Court; that the Supreme Court should make its own rules; that the
Supreme Court should be established along the lines of a non-ministerial department, and
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The Select Committee's Final Report attempted to summarize the
arguments for and against retention of the office of Lord Chancellor,
even though the Select Committee was unable to agree on which of these
arguments should succeed. The Final Report noted the Government's
arguments for abolition based on separation of powers, greater freedom
of choice for the Prime Minister in selecting a minister responsible for
the administration of justice from a wider pool of candidates than senior
lawyers, and excessive workload.34 7  It also described the
counterarguments that abolition would deprive the government of the
advice of a senior lawyer on constitutional questions; risked less
effective protection for important constitutional values; posed the danger
that the minister responsible for judicial affairs might be "over[ly]
influenced by party political considerations" and also might not have
enough seniority to effectively protect the judicial system; would not
serve to reduce the fundamental tension between the functions of
protecting law and order and justice; and would place an unmanageable
workload on the Lord Chief Justice.348
The Final Report also proposed several primary options for reform,
all of which accepted the need for change in accordance with the
Concordat, but could not agree as to which option was best. The options
were: (1) retaining the title of Lord Chancellor for the judicial function
of overseeing judicial administration as well as the political function of
serving as the "constitutional conscience" of Government, and also
retaining the traditional requirements that the Lord Chancellor be a
senior lawyer and member of the House of Lords; (2) retaining the title
of Lord Chancellor as well as the traditional requirements that he be a
senior lawyer and member of the House of Lords, but narrowing the
responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor to the judicial function of
"running the courts"; (3) using the title "Lord Chancellor" for the newly
created ministerial position called "Secretary of State for Constitutional
Affairs" in the Constitutional Reform Bill; (4) ceasing to use the title
Lord Chancellor for the minister responsible for judiciary-related
matters, who might be called the Secretary of State for Constitutional
Affairs or the Minister of Justice. 349 The Select Committee was only
able to agree that the second proposal was not acceptable. 350 The Final
Report stated:
that the bill should be amended to safeguard the separate jurisdiction to be exercised by
the Supreme Court for Scottish, Northern Irish, English and Welsh laws. Id. at 153,
171,178, 183, 200, 206, 213,226, 236, 252, 268, 283.
347. Id. at 16, 18-20.
348. Id. at 22-28.
349. Id. at 35-42.
350. Id. at 45.
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There was a clear division of opinion within the Committee between
those members who considered that the office-holder should be
called Lord Chancellor, be a senior lawyer, and sit in the House of
Lords on the one hand; and those members who considered that the
name of Lord Chancellor should not be continued (since its retention
would be confusing), and that there was no necessity for the office-
holder to hold a legal qualification or sit in the House of Lords on the
other hand (that is, the policy of the bill). Accordingly we make no
recommendation to the House.
351
The Select Committee also could not reach agreement as to whether
the Minister responsible for the administration of justice should be a
lawyer, nor whether he should be a member of the House of Lords. The
Final Report enumerated various arguments for and against both
requirements.352 It noted that those in favor of requiring the Lord
Chancellor to be a senior lawyer contended that this would ensure
seniority and stability and better equip the minister to defend judicial
independence and the rule of law than other ministers. 353  But the
Government and several witnesses who gave evidence to the Select
Committee held the view that being a lawyer was not a necessary
prerequisite for ensuring that a minister would uphold judicial
independence and the rule of law, and also feared that such a limit would
overly restrict the pool of candidates for the position.354 The Final
Report also noted that those who supported retaining the Lord
Chancellor's membership in the House of Lords wanted to ensure the
political influence of the House in the Cabinet by maintaining at least
two Cabinet ministers in the House of Lords (the other would be the
Leader of the Lords).355 But the Government's position was that it
needed a freer hand in appointing ministers and also that it was more
appropriate for the head of a major spending department to be
accountable to the House of Commons.356 The Select Committee was
unable to voice a recommendation on the merits of these arguments. The
Final Report stated that "[t]here was a clear division of opinion between
351. Id. at 44.
352. Id. at 77 60, 66. The Select Committee also could not agree as to whether the
statutory duty of judicial independence should be strengthened to prevent implied repeal.
Id. at 79. It agreed that it should not extend to Scotland. Id. at 93. It also agreed that
the bill should be amended to include a duty placed on the Minister to uphold the rule of
law, but could not agree on the precise form this new clause should take. Id. at TT 73-75.
353. Id. at 77 36 (noting the argument that some policy responsibilities recently given
to the Lord Chancellor's Department and/or the Department for Constitutional Affairs
should be shifted), 50, 54.
354. Id. at 52-53.
355. Id. at$ 65.
356. Id. at 63.
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those members who thought that the Minister had to be a senior lawyer
and those who considered that there was no need for the office-holder to
hold a legal qualification.,
357
Another area of disagreement involved the type of oath to be taken
by the Lord Chancellor/Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs on
taking office. The Select Committee agreed that the Minister responsible
for the administration of justice should not have to swear a judicial oath,
but could not agree as to whether he or she should be required to swear
some other type of oath.358
The Final Report stated that "the question of the future of the
Speakership of the House of Lords is not a statutory matter and so we
make no comment on the policy whereby the Lord Chancellor would
cease to sit as Speaker. 3 59 In the Select Committee's view, alternative
arrangements were a matter for the House of Lords itself.
Despite its inability to agree on so many key issues of the
Constitutional Reform Bill, the Select Committee sent it back to the
Committee of the Whole House. But the proposed legislation ran into
more difficulties there.
b. A Second Setback: The House of Lords votes to amend the bill to
retain the office of Lord Chancellor
Another setback for the Government occurred on July 13, 2004.
After almost four hours of debate, the Committee of the Whole House of
Lords voted to approve an amendment proposed by the Conservative
spokesman Lord Kingsland to retain an office with the title of Lord
Chancellor.360 The vote was fairly close: 240 to 208, with Conservative
peers joining cross-benchers to oppose ending centuries of history and
tradition. 36' During the debate, a former Law Lord, Lord Lloyd of
Berwick, warned that the Lord Chancellor served as an important check
and balance in the Cabinet, and "we get rid of it at our peril. 3 62 But the
Liberal Democrat peer Lord Goodhart countered: "We do not think the
retention of an outdated title will assist the protection of judicial
357. Id at 60.
358. Id. at 61-62.
359. Id. at 95.
360. See 663 PARE. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004), cols. 1137-1193; see also Alison
Hardie, Blow to Blair's bid to axe Lord Chancellor, SCOTSMAN.COM, July 14, 2004,
http://news.scotsman.com/topics.cfin?tid=928&id=804422004; Tories hail Lord
Chancellor vote, BBC NEWS, July 14, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/
ukpolitics/3892175.stm.
361. 663 PARE. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004), cols. 1191-1193; see also Hardie, supra
note 360.
362. 663 PAR... DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004), col. 1149 (speech of Lord Lloyd of
Berwick).
[Vol. 24:2
2005] PLAYING POOHSTICKS WITH THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION? 321
independence and the rule of law." 363 Many of those who voted with the
majority still had concerns about the reduction in Cabinet status of the
Lord Chancellor since the Secretary of Constitutional Affairs was created
as a much more junior Cabinet position.364
After the vote, the perennially cheery Lord Falconer commented
that, in his opinion, the situation was really quite favorable for the
Government's proposal to reform the office of Lord Chancellor.
Falconer pointed out that there was widespread agreement that many
aspects of the proposed reforms should be implemented. "One of the
striking things about the debate this evening was there didn't seem to be
much disagreement about what the role of the Lord Chancellor should
be," he said, adding: "It was agreed that he shouldn't be a judge any
more. It was agreed he shouldn't be head of the judiciary any more. It
was agreed a Judicial Appointments Commission should appoint the
judges.... The issue was about what he should be called.... It's about
a name."
365
By the autumn of 2004, it appeared that the Government was
backing down on this name issue. In a speech delivered at Exeter
University on October 13, 2004 the Lord Chief Justice indicated that it
was likely that the government would agree to retain the title of Lord
Chancellor, though couching his remarks as speculation.366  But
according to Lord Woolf, even if the office of Lord Chancellor was not
abolished, it would be profoundly changed. The Lord Chancellor would
no longer be a judge, or head of the judiciary, would no longer appoint
judges, and would be bound by the concordat.367 To Lord Woolf, this
was progress. He praised it in his Exeter University speech as "a huge
advance. 368
The Government promised to amend the bill to reflect the vote to
retain an office with the title of Lord Chancellor. For example,
provisions that would have abolished the Great Seal Act of 1688 were
withdrawn since there was no reason for custody of the Great Seal to be
transferred away from the Lord Chancellor in light of the continued
existence of the office. 36 9 But Lord Falconer noted:
363. Id. at col. 1152 (speech of Lord Goodhart).
364. Peter Riddell, End of the Judicial Reform Saga is in sight, THE TIMES, Oct 15
2004, at 31.
365. Graeme Wilson, Peers revolt over plan to axe Lord Chancellor, DAILY MAIL,
July 14, 2004, at 29.
366. Lord Woolf, supra note 258 (speech at Exeter University).
367. Id.
368. Id
369. 665 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004), col. 23 (speech of Baroness Ashton of
Upholland). The functions relating to the Great Seal would have been transferred to the
Secretary of State. See supra note 312 and accompanying text.
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But, of course, that does not preclude the Government from seeking
to restore the position of the Secretary of State for Constitutional
Affairs in another place. In any event, the decision made on 13 July
does not extend to whether the Bill should prescribe that the Lord
Chancellor should be a Peer or a lawyer, nor does it extend to the
kind of oath that the Lord Chancellor should take. These issues are
still open for debate....370
c. A Third Setback: The House of Lords votes to require the Lord
Chancellor to be a member of the House of Lords and a senior lawyer
However, in December 2004 the Government suffered a setback on
those issues as well. At the report stage, on December 7, 2004, Lord
Lloyd of Berwick moved an amendment to the bill that would require the
Lord Chancellor be a member of the House of Lords.371 Despite the
Government's opposition, this amendment was carried by a vote of 229
to 206.372 During the same debate, Lord Kingsland moved another
amendment to require the Lord Chancellor to be a senior lawyer, with at
least twelve years of practice experience as a qualifying practitioner as
well as at least two years of judicial experience in a high judicial
office.373 The Government also opposed this amendment, on the basis
that it would unduly restrict the pool from which a minister could be
selected and that a lawyer would not necessarily advance judicial
independence more than a non-lawyer.374 But this amendment was also
carried, by a vote of 215 to 175.375
Despite these three big setbacks to the Government's proposals to
reform the office of Lord Chancellor, the reforms were not dead. The
Government successfully moved a number of amendments in December
of 2004. These included an amendment designed to combat the fear that
reform of the office of the Lord Chancellor would weaken the protection
of the rule of law by adding a new provision that "This Act does not
adversely affect (a) the existing constitutional principle of the rule of
law; or (b) the Lord Chancellor's existing constitutional role in relation
to that principle. 3 76  Lord Falconer also successfully moved an
amendment that provided that the bill should state explicitly that the
Lord Chief Justice would be the head of the judiciary in England and
370. 665 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004), col. 13.
371. 667 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004), col. 749.
372. Id. at cols. 774-775 (speech of Lord Falconer of Thoroton), 776-778.
373. Id. at col. 779.
374. Id. at cols. 783-84 (speech of Lord Falconer of Thoroton).
375. Id. at cols. 785-787.
376. Id. at cols. 738-42 (amendment held over until Third Reading); id. at cols 1538-
40 (final text of amendment agreed to on Third Reading).
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Wales and would have the title of the President of the Courts of England
and Wales.377 At the report stage on December 7, 2004, the Government
also introduced a new Schedule 4 of miscellaneous statutory
amendments, including removal of the statutory basis for the Lord
Chancellor to sit as a judge.378 The Constitutional Reform Bill was
transferred to the House of Commons on December 21, 2004.379
d. Additional Setbacks in the House of Commons
As the bill proceeded through three readings in the House of
Commons by the first of March, 2005, it continued to meet considerable
opposition. Much of the opposition was, as before, founded on
procedural concerns that the reforms were overly rushed and initiated
with inadequate consultation. As a result of these procedural flaws, it
was harder for the Government build a consensus on the necessity of its
plans to abolish the Lord Chancellor's office.
In debate in the House of Commons, many members voiced concern
about the haste with which the Government had initiated its proposed
reforms. The Conservative Member of Parliament Dominic Grieve
called it a "back-of-the-envelope job., 380 David Heathcoat-Amory, also
a Conservative Member of Parliament, called the effort to abolish the
Lord Chancellor as part of a Cabinet reshuffle without consultation with
the Queen, the senior judiciary, the Cabinet, or the House of Commons
"outrageous., 381 Heathcoat-Amory likened the Government's attempts at
constitutional reform to "a blind monkey trying to do a jigsaw puzzle."
He accused them of "lurch[ing] from one-ill thought-out proposal to
another without any real understanding or analysis of the underlying
principles and accumulated wisdom that is personified in that collection
of statutes and conventions that we call the British Constitution. 382
Others voiced even stronger criticism of the Government. Edward
Gamier, the Conservative Member of Parliament for Harborough,
admitted that some valuable political documents like the Gettsyburg
Address had been written on the back of an envelope, but contended:
377. Id. at col. 795-796 (speech of Lord Falconer). Lord Falconer stated that it was
his intention to table another amendment to provide that the Lord Chief Justice of
Northern Ireland was the head of the judiciary there and noted that "As justice is a
devolved matter in Scotland, we have left the position in that jurisdiction to be dealt with
by the Scottish Parliament." Id. at col. 795.
378. Id. atcols. 822-881.
379. See Explanatory Notes, supra note 307, at 1.
380. 429 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005), col. 573 (speech of Dominic Grieve, MP
for Beaconsfield (Cons.).
381. Id. at col. 638 (speech of David Heathcoat-Amory, MP for Wells (Cons.).
382. Id.
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[W]e are not here presented with some Leonardo-style doodle by a
perceptive intellect on the constitution; we are hearing about what is
effectively a mediaeval assassination note written by a contemporary
Henry II to rid himself of a turbulent Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of
Lairg. To do that, the Prime Minister had to invent a system that
required abolition of the office, without thinking of the
383
consequences.
The former Conservative Minister of Agriculture John Gummer
complained that "[the] Bill exists not because of a concerted and sensible
approach to the constitution, but because the Prime Minister made a
bodge-up." He continued:
To try to overcome that, it was thought better to try to produce
something that might at least stand up, by which time he was in no
position to gain a commonality of view. A considered response is
crucial on constitutional matters. It would not matter if we were
discussing a less important subject, but it matters not to have got a
considered consensual response on a question that lies at the heart of
the relationship between the powers of Government, the House of
Commons, the House of Lords and the judiciary. 384
Similar concerns were voiced even by some who supported the need for
reform of the office of Lord Chancellor. For example, the Liberal
Democrat Member of Parliament for Berwick-upon-Tweed, A J Beith,
called the Government's efforts "a hopeless way to embark. on
constitutional reform.... They managed to convey the impression that
the proposals were designed to weaken and politicise the judiciary,
which is precisely the reverse of the intention and, I hope, of the
effect. ' 3 85 According to Beith, process mattered a great deal. He stated,
"The way that the matter was introduced made it much more difficult to
argue for the reforms in principle and then get the detail right. 386
Procedural concerns were not limited to the way in which the
Government had originally announced their proposal. They also
concerned the amount of parliamentary scrutiny devoted to the bill. The
Government used a "programme motion," a procedure for timetabling
the future stages of a bill that is moved directly after second reading of a
bill, in order to forestall Opposition delaying tactics by limiting the
amount of time that the bill would be debated on the floor of the House
of Commons.3 87 Since 2000, programme motions have been commonly
383. Id. at col. 645 (speech of Edward Gamier).
384. Id. at col. 609 (speech of John Gummer (Suffolk, Coastal (Cons.)).
385. Id. at col. 627 (speech of A J Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed, Lib. Dem.).
386. Id.
387. Id. at col. 568.
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used for government bills.388 Under the programme motion for the
Constitutional Reform Bill moved after its second reading on January 17,
2005, most of it would be discussed by a standing Committee, including
such controversial issues as whether the Lord Chancellor should be a
peer and/or a lawyer. Programme motions are not generally debatable.3 89
Still, a number of MPs expressed the view that the programme motion
did not permit sufficient scrutiny by the whole House of Commons. For
example, John Gummer urged that the whole Constitutional Reform Bill
should be debated on the floor of the House of Lords.3 90 Dominic Grieve
agreed, contending that that was the established convention for
constitutional reform bills.391 Gummer also argued that the programme
motion was directly contrary to the bill's purpose of improving public
perceptions of the constitutional system. Gummer stated:
He [Christopher Leslie, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
for Constitutional Affairs representing the Government in debate in
the House of Commons] has told us that the Bill's purpose is
primarily to address the fact that people outside do not understand the
complications and what appear to be the contradictions in our present
system. Does he not understand that the same is true of what he has
just said? People outside will not understand why there is no
procedure whereby we will be able to discuss, on the Floor of the
House, a major constitutional change. 392
Nevertheless the programme motion carried, by a vote of 297-161.
393
One reason for the Government's attempts to push the legislation through
Parliament with such great speed was clearly political expediency since a
general election was widely expected to be held in May or June of
2005. 394 This was an accurate prediction. A general election was held
on May 5, 2005. Blair's Labour Party achieved a historic third term in
power, although their Parliamentary majority fell from 167 in 2001 to
66. 395
Later in January, the Government backed down slightly on the time
limits for debate in its programme motion, and moved to amend it to
388. See House of Commons Information Office, Government Factsheet P1O,
Programming of Government Bills at 1 (Jan. 2004), available at
http://www.parliament.uk/factsheets (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
389. Id. at 3.
390. See 429 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005), col. 570 (speech of John Gummer).
391. Id. at col. 578 (speech of Dominic Grieve).
392. Id.
393. See id. at cols. 656-660.
394. See And Then There Were Six, ABERDEEN PRESS AND J., Oct. 4, 2004, at 4; Daily
press q andq, W. DAILY PRESS, Apr. 21, 2004, at 6.
395. BBC News.com, Blair Secures Historic Third Term, May 6, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/uk politics/vote_2005/frontpage/4519863.stm.
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have the entire bill debated on the floor of the House of Commons (by
the Committee of the Whole House).396 But the Government was still
under the significant time pressure posed by the forthcoming general
election and the amended programme motion allocated only three days
for debate on the bill.397 As many Members of Parliament complained at
the time, this was a ridiculously short time for debate on constitutional
issues of such magnitude. 398  Nevertheless, the amendment was
agreed.399
The Government also capitulated on the name issue. At the second
reading of the bill, the Government formally announced that the title of
Lord Chancellor would be retained.4 °° It claimed that it viewed the title
as largely symbolic, and as not affecting the substance of the reforms.
40 1
The Government's U-turn on whether the office of Lord Chancellor
would in fact be abolished was not the first time it had backed down on
constitutional reform after pressure from the House of Lords. This
happened to Lord Falconer's plans to move ahead with abolishing the
ninety-two hereditary peers that remained in the House of Lords after the
Government's first stage of House of Lords reform.40 2
Despite its capitulation on the name issue, the Government was
prepared to give way on whether the Lord Chancellor should be required
to be a peer and senior lawyer.40 3 There was considerable debate on both
of those issues.4°4 On third reading, the House of Commons voted in
favor of amendments that would overturn the House of Lords'
requirement that the Lord Chancellor be a peer and senior lawyer.40 5
In the middle of March, 2005 the amendments made in the
396. 430 PARE. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005), col. 589 (speech of Christopher Leslie).
397. Id.
398. See, e.g., id. at cols. 590 (speeches of Patrick Cormack (South Staffordshire
(Cons.), William Cash, (Stone (Cons.), Edward Gamier), 637-638 (speech of Edward
Gamier.).
399. Id. at cols. 591-592.
400. 429 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005), col. 556 (speech of Christopher Leslie)
(stating "The Government accept the decision of the House of Lords on the retention of
the title and formal office of Lord Chancellor. Whether the post holder is called
"Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs' or "Lord Chancellor," or whether he has
both titles, is not a matter of great significance").
401. Id. at col. 558 (speech of Christopher Leslie).
402. See Lords to Get Wings Clipped, BIRMINGHAM POST, Mar. 22, 2004, at 7.
403. 429 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005), col. 559 (speech of Christopher Leslie).
404. See, e.g., id. at cols. 574 (speech of Dominic Grieve), 580, 598, 623, 624 (speech
of Douglas Hogg (Sleaford and North Hykeham (Cons.)), 614-616 (speech of Vera Baird
(Redcar (Lab.)), 639 (speech of David Heathcoat-Amory).
405. See, e.g., 430 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005), cols. 663-665 (vote of 272-119
to remove House of Lords requirement that the Lord Chancellor must be a peer), 681-683
(vote of 272-126 to remove House of Lords requirement that the Lord Chancellor must be
a senior lawyer or judge),
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Commons were brought to the House of Lords for consideration. The
House of Lords sent a message to the House of Commons that they did
not agree to the amendments that would allow the Lord Chancellor to be
a Member of the House of Commons and removed the requirement that
the Lord Chancellor be a senior lawyer with twelve years experience or a
senior judge of at least two year seniority.40 6 But the House of Commons
nevertheless voted in favor of these amendments on March 16 .40  The
long standoff between the two Houses of Parliament finally ended on
March 21, when the Lords held two second votes on these issues. They
voted by 203 to 191 to allow the post of Lord Chancellor to be held by
either a Member of Parliament or a peer, and by 201 to 189 to accept the
Government's position that the Lord Chancellor did not have to be a
senior lawyer or judge.40 8 Shortly afterward, on March 24, 2005, the
Constitutional Reform Bill received Royal Assent.40 9
Although the Government did not succeed in abolishing the office
of Lord Chancellor as it had originally proposed, it did succeed in
legislating many of the reforms to the Lord Chancellor's functions that it
had sought. The result is profound change to the office. The Lord
Chancellor will no longer automatically serve as speaker of the House of
Lords.410 Nor will he serve as a judge or as head of the judiciary, and his
role in relation to the appointment and disciplining of the judiciary is
greatly reduced.41 1 Additionally, the Constitutional Reform Act imposes
a new statutory duty on the Lord Chancellor and other government
Ministers to uphold judicial independence.41 2 Cumulatively, these
reforms increase the separation of powers. As an end result, they thus
advance the Government's goal of improved external perceptions of
fairness and judicial independence from political pressure in the British
constitutional system.
But the hasty, ill-considered, and secret process used to initiate and
implement the reforms does not comport with this goal and has not
inspired public confidence. The Government's failure to achieve a
considered consensus for its reforms is a dangerous way to embark on
406. 432 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005), col. 358. For the votes in the House of
Lords, see 670 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2005), cols. 1215, 1241-1243 (the vote was
215-199 in favor of an amendment overturning the Government's amendment that the
Lord Chancellor need not be a peer), 1244-1246 (the vote was 209-195 in favor of an
amendment overturning the Government's amendment that the Lord Chancellor need not
be a senior lawyer or judge).
407. 432 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005), col. 371.
408. 671 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2005), cols. 39-44.
409. See Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, c. 4 (U.K.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2005/20050004.htm (last visited Sept. 29, 2005).
410. Id. at § 18, sched. 6.
411. Id. at§7,11, sched. 4.
412. Id. at § 3.
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constitutional reform. That is so even if, under a system lacking a
written constitution, the reforms could be changed through statute and do
not require the kind of Parliamentary super-majority that would be
required to amend a written constitution. The haste and chaos of the
initial announcements of the reform proposals did not make it appear that
the reforms were based on reasoned principles, were really necessary, or
were adequately worked out in their details. Additionally, as Dawn
Oliver has pointed out, the "atmosphere of distrust" engendered by the
flawed reform process has raised questions about the ability of other
constitutional conventions underlying the British constitutional system to
continue to work.4 13
VI. Conclusion: Why the British Constitutional Reforms Deserve
American Attention
Why should Americans pay attention to proposed reforms to the
British Lord Chancellor since an equivalent office does not exist in the
United States and it forms part of a constitutional system that is
significantly different to the American system in many ways, including
the lack of a written constitution and a different approach to separation of
powers? The primary reason is the kind of "external" concern that, as
noted at the outset of this article, has preoccupied both Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor and Tony Blair's Government.4 14
As in Britain, judicial independence is a fundamental political and
constitutional value in the American system. Chief Justice Rehnquist
called judicial independence "one of the crown jewels of our system of
government today. ',4 15 But while in Britain most voices are clamoring
for greater judicial independence, many Americans on both sides of the
political spectrum have recently complained that there is excessive
judicial independence in the United States and therefore advocate some
reduction in the power of the judiciary. Critics of judicial independence
on the political right include Robert Bork and Senator Orrin Hatch.416
Many other commentators who lean politically more to the left, including
Alan Dershowitz and Margaret-Jane Radin, have also expressed deep
413. Dawn Oliver, Constitutionalism and the Abolition of the Lord Chancellor, 57
PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS 754, 765-66 (2004).
414. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
415. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Keynote Address at the Washington College
of Law's Symposium on the Future of the Federal Courts (Apr. 9, 1996), in 46 AM. U. L.
REV. 263,274 (1996).
416. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 96-122 (1996); Senator Orr-in Hatch, Remarks
Before the Federalist Society's l0th Anniversary Lawyers Convention (Nov. 15, 1996), in
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 23 (1997).
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concern about excessive judicial independence as a result of the Supreme
Court's decision in Bush v. Gore.4 17
An additional point of contrast is that, as Britain moves toward most
other modem democracies toward enshrining the fundamental
constitutional value of judicial independence in written documents like
the concordat, questions are being raised in America about whether its
written Constitution needs to be amended to protect against excessive
judicial activism. 418
As Americans struggle with the question of how much judicial
independence there should be in the United States legal system, they
should look outside their system to see how other democracies are
dealing with the same issue. In an era where America is seeking to
export its democratic system abroad, it is important to ensure that the
American justice system is itself safeguarding fundamental human
values. Justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done.
417. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT
HIJACKED ELECTION 2000, 5-9, 173-75 (Oxford U. Press 2001); Margaret-Jane Radin, Can
the Rule of Law Survive Bush v. Gore?, in BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY
110 (Bruce Ackerman, ed. 2002).
418. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by
Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REv. 397
(Winter 1999).

